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Abstract
We study how consumer search affects pricing in markets with incumbents
and entrants using panel data on German electricity retail markets. Consumers
observe the baseline price of the incumbent and decide whether or not to search.
Incumbent providers can price discriminate between searching and loyal con-
sumers. Empirically we show that local incumbents increase their baseline rate
while entrants decrease their tariffs if consumer search increases. Moreover, the
incumbent price discriminates more strongly in markets with more consumer
search. Using a theoretical model, we show that these pricing patterns are
consistent with the strategic interaction of profit-maximizing firms.
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1 Introduction
Many markets where liberalization has taken place are characterized by a substan-
tial asymmetry between the incumbent provider and new entrants in that consumers
know the contract with their current provider, but have to pay a search cost to
be informed of the contracts alternative providers offer. Knowing the alternative
contracts provided, consumers also have to be willing to switch. Reacting to the
presence of entrants, the incumbent may use this asymmetry and price discriminate
between consumers with high search costs and consumers with lower search costs
who may consider leaving. This paper studies the asymmetric interaction between
the incumbent and the entrants, consumers’ willingness to search for and switch to
alternative providers, and the price discrimination strategy of the incumbent. In
our empirical analysis, we investigate these relationships using data from the Ger-
man retail electricity markets. In particular, we investigate how the extent of price
discrimination and price dispersion depends on the fraction of consumers search-
ing for alternative providers, taking into account that consumer search behavior is
endogenously determined by the pricing behavior of firms. Our theoretical model
shows the general mechanism that explains why many liberalized markets are still
characterized by high retail prices and price dispersion.1
The empirical part of our analysis employs a unique data set on retail electricity
prices and consumer search intensity at the German zip code level for the period
2011–2014. The German retail electricity market has been liberalized at the end
of the previous millennium, where former local monopolies have been replaced by
local retail competition. Since then, local incumbents compete with new entrants
and all consumers that have initially stayed with their local incumbent supplier at
the baseline tariff, have the freedom to search for cheaper offers and switch to any
alternative tariff that is available in their zip code. Even though in recent years
most consumers use online platforms to search for cheaper rates,2 in 2015 76% of
households stayed with the incumbent, with 33% remaining at the expensive baseline
tariff, while 43% switched to a cheaper incumbent tariff, and only 24% switched to
a new entrant.3 Hence, some two decades after liberalization the former incumbent
still prices well above costs and the market is characterized by substantial price
dispersion.
A key aspect of our dataset is the fact that we have data on consumer search
1This is also true for electricity markets around the world. See, e.g., Cabral (2017) for evidence
related to different European countries and Hortacsu et al. (2017) for evidence on the USA.
2According to a 2011 survey, 80% of the switchers searched online for alterna-
tive providers ("http://www.atkearney.at/documents/3709812/3710656/BIP_Der_Strom_und_
Gasvertrieb_im_Wandel.pdf", March 3, 2016). This number is likely to have increased in more
recent years.
3See the 2015 report of the German regulatory authority (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015).
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intensity at the zip code level. In particular, we have data on the actual number of
search queries at online price comparison platforms, and given that most of the search
for lower prices is via these platforms, we interpret these data as a direct measure of
search intensity at the local level. Such data are generally not available and other
empirical studies on consumer search markets often rely on indirect measures of
consumer search activity.4 Moreover, we are not aware of any paper having a direct
measure of consumer search intensity in a panel data context.5
In terms of prices, we have access to the baseline and online price of the in-
cumbent and the lowest online price of an entrant at the zip code level. Using these
data, we empirically show that more consumer search tempts incumbents to increase
their baseline rates and entrants to decrease their tariffs. Moreover, the incumbent
increases the extent of price discrimination and sets its cheapest online tariff much
lower when consumers search more. Price discrimination allows the incumbent to
segment markets according to search intensity, and to simultaneously appropriate
surplus from loyal consumers and prevent the entrant from stealing the business of
many searching consumers. Search intensity and pricing are likely to affect each
other simultaneously as search intensity may be a function of prices (e.g. Tappata,
2009; Yang and Ye, 2008) and retailers’ pricing strategies may take into account the
consumers’ level of information (i.e. their search efforts). We address the potential
reverse causality of pricing on search intensity by using instrumental variables.
The theoretical model we build serves two purposes. First, it shows that the
empirical patterns can be easily understood as resulting from the interaction of the
different incentives the incumbent, entrants and consumers have. Second, by means
of the model, we are able to evaluate whether consumers are better or worse off
because of price discrimination. The model has the following elements. Retail firms
produce a homogeneous good so that consumers only search for better prices. Con-
sumers differ in search and switching costs. Consumers observe the base price the
incumbent sets to all consumers at no cost. Having observed the base price, con-
sumers have to decide whether or not to search. Search is costly and allows the
consumers to observe all other prices in the market. In the context of the German
electricity market, or other markets where price comparison websites are available,
one can think of search as consulting a platform so that at a cost consumers have ac-
4Many papers proxy for lower search costs or consumers’ level of information by access to the
internet or online versus oﬄine purchases (Brown and Goolsbee, 2002; Brynjolfsson and Smith,
2014). Similarly, Pennersdorfer et al. (2015) use commuters versus non-commuters to distinguish
between informed and uninformed consumers in the retail gasoline market and Chandra and Tappata
(2011) use the distance between gas stations as a proxy for consumer information.
5While some papers have direct measures for search intensity, these measures are time series
rather than panels. For instance, Byrne and De Roos (2017) have local price data for gasoline
stations but their measure of search intensity is a time series of web traffic at the government’s
transparency site (Fuelwatch). Similarly, Lewis and Marvel (2011)) also use local gasoline prices
but use a time series of web traffic at a website that reports gasoline prices (Alexa).
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cess to all prices available. At the platform, consumers choose between buying from
the lowest-price entrant or staying with the incumbent at the price the incumbent
announced on the platform. Consumer specific brand loyalty or switching cost im-
ply the incumbent can charge higher prices on the platform than entrants. We show
that by varying the search cost distribution, this simple model can accommodate a
rich pattern of pricing and search behaviors, including the ones we find in the em-
pirical part of the paper, namely that if the fraction of consumers with small search
costs increases, price dispersion and price discrimination increase simultaneously
with the fraction of consumers who search online, while the incumbent raises its
baseline price to consumers who do not search. By means of our model, we can also
analyze the counterfactual situation where the incumbent is prohibited from price
discriminating between online and oﬄine marketing channels. We show that search-
ing consumers are better off under price discrimination, while “loyal” consumers are
worse off. For a large class of search cost distributions, the latter effect dominates
so that on average, consumers are worse off because of price discrimination.
The German electricity market is just one example of a market where important
market liberalizations have taken placeover the last 20–30 years. Many of these
markets (including electricity markets in many states of the USA6 and Canada, the
UK, other EU Member States – following up the EU energy reform process –, other
European countries, e.g. Norway, and other parts of the world) share important
features with the German electricity market. In all these markets, new firms have
entered, but because consumers buy on a continuous basis from the incumbent,
there is an important asymmetry as consumers know the base price of the incumbent
whereas they have to incur a search cost to learn other prices. Moreover, incumbents
may engage in price discrimination between consumers who have indicated they
will terminate the baseline contract. There are many examples of other sectors,
such as natural gas, telecommunications, health insurance, railways, postal services,
and airlines, that have been liberalized where consumers may switch away from
incumbents (or established firms) to alternative suppliers.7 A key dividing line
between these examples is whether or not consumers have ongoing contracts with
their suppliers or not. Thus, like electricity markets, telecommunications and health
insurance markets have the feature that consumers are naturally informed about
their current supplier and will automatically continue their contract as long as they
do not search for and switch to alternatives. In most of the other markets mentioned
(e.g. railways, postal services or airlines), the natural incumbency effect is likely
6Some states have (partly) abandoned the deregulation reforms as a consequence of the Cali-
fornia electricity crisis in 2001 (followed shortly afterwards by the Ontario electricity crisis).
7There are other examples of markets that work in a similar fashion but are not subject to
liberalization. For example, patents on drugs allow for a temporary monopoly of the patent holder.
Once the patent expires, pharmaceutical companies face competition from suppliers of generic drugs.
4
to be much smaller as consumers do not have an ongoing contract for continuous
delivery.8
As the focus of the paper is on the impact of consumer search on price dispersion
and price discrimination in liberalized markets, it contributes to different strands
of literature. There is a large and varied theoretical literature on how consumer
search affects price dispersion in homogeneous goods markets (Stahl (1989), and
Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) for theoretical contributions). Most of the
theoretical models are based on random search, whereas in liberalized markets, it
is important to account for the incumbency effect as consumers are served by their
local incumbent at the baseline tariff unless they proactively search for and switch
to a cheaper alternative tariff.
Several empirical studies focus on price dispersion and search intensity (see, e.g.,
Sorensen (2000), Chandra and Tappata (2011), and De los Santos et al. (2012) for
empirical studies). An early example is Brown and Goolsbee (2002) who use the
variation in internet usage as a measure of consumer information. In the market for
life insurance, they find that internet usage has a non-monotonic impact on price
dispersion. More recently, Tang et al. (2010) examine the impact of changes in
shopbot use on prices and price dispersion in online book retailing and find that an
increase in shopbot use reduces average prices and price dispersion. Pennersdorfer
et al. (2015) find an inverted U-shaped relation between price dispersion and the
share of informed consumers (as proxied by the share of commuters) in the Austrian
gasoline retail market; Sengupta and Wiggins (2014) investigate whether online and
oﬄine prices for airline fares differ but do not find a significant difference. However,
the above literature does not explicitly deal with the incumbency effects and the
resulting asymmetry between firms that is important to understand the functioning
of liberalized markets. More precisely, the literature generally assumes that the
shares of informed and uninformed consumers are randomly assigned between firms
which clearly does not hold true for markets with an incumbency effect.
8Our findings are also of importance to other sectors which have not been liber-
alized recently, such as retail banking, where consumers who search (online) may get
much better deals than loyal consumers. For example, in the recent article “American
banks pay depositors less than online accounts”, in The Economist (see, The Economist
(2018/02/15) at \https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21737031-they-seem-
be-relying-power-inertia-retain-their-customersa-risky) it is stated that established U.S. banks gen-
erally offer substantially lower interest rates on savings accounts compared to online rates offered
to clients at internet portals and that the gap widens significantly. And more interestingly, the
established banks even lowered the offered interest rates while online banks drastically increased
them in recent years. While for established banks, the offered interest rate dropped on average from
0.11% in 2014 to only 0.09% in February 2018, online customers’ rates rose from 0.87% to 1.52%
in the same period. These patterns are attributed to differences in search behaviors. As in our
case, online offers are partly generated by firms that have only online operations, but also by firms
(banks) that offer different prices on different retail channels. Our approach focuses, however, on
single (local) incumbents competing with entrants, whereas in the banking sector there are many
“incumbents” in the same market.
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A growing literature deals explicitly with search in electricity markets, but most
of these papers focus on how consumers search. Giulietti et al. (2014) analyze
the retail electricity market in the United Kingdom and find that roughly half the
households had relatively high search costs. In contrast to our paper they analyze the
2002–2005 period where consumers searched sequentially as information on suppliers’
prices was most commonly obtained from a salesperson (for a particular supplier)
coming to the customer’s door. Hortacsu et al. (2017) analyze switching in the
Texas retail electricity market and find that even though households generally switch
to alternative retailers only rarely, they do switch more after experiencing a “bill
shock”. Moreover, they also find that households attach a brand advantage to the
incumbent. In contrast to our study, both papers do not observe the actual search
behavior of consumers.
There is a small literature dealing with price discrimination and incumbency.
For the UK retail electricity market, Davies et al. (2014) present evidence suggest-
ing that firms deliberately differentiated their tariff structures, resulting in market
segmentation according to consumers’ usage. For the US mobile telephone sector,
Seim and Viard (2011) show that entry induces firms to lower prices on average
and to offer larger menus with more evenly spread usage plans that give benefits
to high-valuation consumers in particular. For the same sector, Miravete (2011)
finds that incumbents – as a response to entry – temporarily increase the fogginess
of their tariffs relative to the monopoly phase, while entrants use foggy pricing far
less frequently. In the paper, foggy pricing refers to the practice of offering tariff
options that are always more expensive than other offered tariff options regardless
of usage profile, aiming to obfuscate consumers with high search costs and selling
them contracts with deceptive prices. For the US airline industry, Goolsbee and
Syverson (2008) indicate that incumbents respond to the threat of entry by sub-
stantially reducing average fares on the directly threatened routes, but that they do
not cut prices on routes to nearby airports in the same market. This bears some
relationship to our result that the incumbent price discriminates more severely be-
tween searching consumers who can choose an alternative option and non-searching
consumers who cannot.
At a theoretical level, the idea that a firm would like to price discriminate against
consumers with higher search cost is not new (see, e.g., Salop, 1977). Salop (1977)
sets his argument, however, in a monopoly setting, and critically depends on the
assumption that the monopolist is committed to charging prices according to a price
distribution, while consumers can somehow react to changes in the price distribution
(assuming they observe the distribution, but not the prices) by adopting a different
search strategy. Cabral and Gilbukh (2017) also model firms engaging in price
discrimination between active and passive searchers. Unless they pay a search cost,
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consumers buy from the high price of a firm. By paying the search cost and becoming
active, they have access to all low prices of all firms. The focus of Cabral and
Gilbukh (2017) is, however, very different from ours. They study a market where
symmetric firms face cost shocks and they study the equilibrium price reactions
to these cost shocks. In our paper, we want to understand how the asymmetric
price behavior between incumbents and entrants is affected by the presence of more
searching consumers.
Our paper explains that an incumbent’s baseline price (and possibly average
prices) may increase when there is more consumer search in the market. The suc-
cess of market liberalization hinges on the possible strategies of the incumbent.
Price discrimination allows the incumbent to segment consumers according to their
search intensity, and to simultaneously appropriate surplus from consumers with
high search cost and prevent entrants stealing the business of consumers with lower
search cost. This pricing strategy prevents many consumers from switching supplier
and at the same time allows the incumbent to appropriate market power rents.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
German retail electricity market in more detail. We then investigate the search-
pricing nexus in the German retail electricity market. Section 3 describes the em-
pirical identification strategy, section 4 discusses the data, and section 5 presents
the econometric results and shows the robustness of the results to alternative spec-
ifications. Section 6 provides a theoretical model explaining the empirical findings
and evaluating the welfare effects of price discrimination. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Retail Electricity Market
In 1999 Germany’s electricity liberalization brought about the end of local monop-
olies by allowing entry to local markets and giving consumers the choice to switch
from their former local incumbent to alternative suppliers. It was believed that
increased competition and freedom of consumer choice would eventually result in
lower retail margins with large economic benefits for consumers. Prior to market
liberalization, the local incumbent served all customers in its distribution grid area
at a regulated tariff. After liberalization, the incumbents are legally obliged to sup-
ply electricity at a baseline tariff to all households which do not proactively choose
another supplier.9 However, the incumbents’ baseline tariffs are no longer regulated
9There is always only a single incumbent at each address which is defined by law. By law, the
incumbent is defined as the local electricity retailer with the largest customer base. In theory, a
different retailer may become the new incumbent because of that. However, due to the very low
switching rates this is never the case in practice and the original incumbent almost never changed.
The only exceptions where the incumbent changed were due to a few mergers of municipal utilities
in the past two decades.
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and households are free to switch to any alternative tariff offered for their local
address, either by one of the many new entrants or by their local incumbent.
Retail entry in the German electricity market can be characterized as fairly easy
since it follows a regulated, non-discriminatory procedure, and involves low entry
costs and risks. This is also witnessed by the large number of active firms: there
are on average 133 firms per zip code area with a range of 55 to 192. There are
several reasons for local retail entry, such as (i) direct electricity contracts with local
electricity producers;10 (ii) vertical integration, so that operations happen around
the locations of the power plants; and (iii) local bureaucracy, such as the obligation
to become a member of the regional balancing group coordinator in its service area.
Another important characteristic is that all retailers that compete in a certain
area have almost identical costs. Some cost components like grid charges and con-
cession fees differ not only over time but also at a very local level. However, they
are equal for all retailers in the local market. Other cost components like subsidies
for renewable energies only change over time but do not have local variation. Costs
for purchasing wholesale electricity are also almost identical across retailers since
wholesale electricity prices are determined centrally at the European Energy Ex-
change (EEX).11 Some other costs, such as administrative or advertisement costs,
may differ across retailers but only account for a very minor part of (variations in)
the retail costs. Thus, while costs are very similar for all retailers in the local mar-
ket, due to locally varying cost components, the costs vary substantially across local
markets in Germany.
Many incumbents operate only at a very local level and 46% of the incumbents
only have a single zip code in their incumbency area. These small incumbents are
mostly municipal utilities. Larger incumbents often have several zip codes in their
incumbency area. The incumbency areas of incumbents with more than one zip code
cover 5 zip codes at the median and 32 at the mean. Hence, as the costs differ at a
very local level, they also often vary within the same incumbency area, and so do the
prices: incumbents with more than one zip code set on average 3.5 different prices in
their incumbency areas. For incumbents with more than one price zone, the prices
within the same incumbency area differ on average by 10.4 Euro/3.5 MWh.12 To
10If a firm operates in the whole country, it has to meet its demand (and demand fluctuations)
throughout Germany. For this reason, such a company may have to operate at the power exchange
to fulfill its delivery commitments. Operating at the power exchange, however, is associated with
operational, managerial and transaction costs (e.g. it may necessitate having a trading department,
which may be costly). Thus, smaller providers may prefer direct contracts with local electricity
producers, and thus only operate locally.
11Even if firms buy electricity through direct contracts with electricity producers, the spot price
still represents the opportunity costs of purchasing electricity.
12The largest observed difference of the base tariffs within the same incumbency area of 134
Euro/MWh was in 2012 by E.ON Avacon Vertrieb GmbH, which served 189 zip codes with 14
different price zones.
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give an example, in 2011 the incumbency area of Envia Mitteldeutsche Energie AG,
a relatively large incumbent operating in 312 zip codes, had 25 different price zones
with prices ranging from 930 to 982 Euro/3.5 MWh. Appendix Figure A8 illustrates
the base tariffs set by Envia Mitteldeutsche Energie GmbH within its incumbency
area.
At the start of the liberalization process, all consumers were automatically sup-
plied by their local incumbent and paid the baseline tariff. However, German law
grants consumers the right to switch away from the incumbent baseline tariff at any
time with two weeks’ notice. Consumers who switch from the baseline tariff generally
make a one-year contract with their new supplier, which is automatically renewed
if the consumer does not cancel the contract in time.13 Thus, once a consumer has
decided to switch, the costs related to being locked in are higher.
In recent years, most households who consider changing their supplier visit an
online price comparison platform. The largest platforms are Verivox, Toptarif,
and Check24. Besides Toptarif, our database also covers all search activities con-
ducted on several other well-known online price comparison platforms including
Stromtipp.de (power hint), Energieverbraucherportal.de (energy consumption por-
tal) and mut-zum-wechseln.de (courage to change). Verivox started to provide search
services in electricity in 2000, Toptarif in 2007, and Check24 in 2008. Despite this
fairly recent trend of searching through platforms, in 2011 80% of switchers had
already searched online for alternative providers, according to a survey.14
The switching rate has been growing in recent years (see Figure 1), as online price
comparison platforms have significantly reduced the costs of searching for cheaper
providers (something that is also acknowledged in other markets; see e.g. Bar-Isaac
et al., 2012). A comparison portal requires a consumer to enter all relevant details
(zip code, expected yearly electricity consumption, whether the contract is for private
or commercial use). Then there are several options to choose from, such as whether
or not to only consider “green” electricity, whether or not prices are guaranteed
throughout the year15 and whether or not the listed tariffs should include one-off
bonuses. The platform then lists the “personalized” prices of all providers that are
active in the indicated zip code ranked from lowest to highest. For each tariff, the
13Consumers may also opt for monthly contracts in some tariffs, but this is rarely done. Ac-
cording to a market report by the German regulatory authority Bundesnetzagentur (2013, p. 150),
the average contract period is 10 months, suggesting that the majority choose yearly contracts.
During the term of the contract, consumers can only switch if their supplier changes the price or
they move to another zip code in which their current retailer is not active. Consumers then have
an extraordinary termination right.
14"http://www.atkearney.at/documents/3709812/3710656/BIP_Der_Strom_und_
Gasvertrieb_im_Wandel.pdf", March 3, 2016.
15Consumers have an extraordinary termination right if their retailer adjusts the price. Retailers
may also adjust prices if they are advertised as “guaranteed”, e.g. retailers are allowed to adjust
prices if the EEG surcharge or grid fees change even if they offered a price guarantee.
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Figure 1: Average switching rates of households in German retail
electricity markets
Note: Data on supplier changes are obtained from Germany’s regulatory authority
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2015), data on the number of German households are from
the German Federal Statistical Office. Switching rates include not only switching
from the incumbent to an entrant but also to a large extent switching among
entrant suppliers.
platform also provides information on how much consumers can save over the year
compared to the incumbent’s baseline price. An example of a typical screenshot of an
online platform is given in the Appendix (see Figure A1). Thus, the search process
costs a little bit of time and effort, but for all consumers who are familiar with online
shopping, the search costs seem relatively small compared to the potential savings
of switching from the incumbents’ baseline tariff to the overall cheapest tariff, which
are on average almost 200 Euro per year for a standard two-person household with
3,500 kWh consumption. The potential gains from search range from 77 to 354 Euro
per year, depending on the households’ location, as shown in Figure 2 for the year
2012.
Not only have search costs declined over time, switching costs have also been
significantly reduced as switching is now an automated process and conducted en-
tirely by the new provider a consumer chooses. The new supplier automatically
arranges all switching activities for new customers, such as unsubscribing from the
old supplier and registration, at no additional cost.16
16In many other countries, the switching process for electricity providers is comparable to the one
in Germany’s retail electricity markets. E.g., studying the UK market, Giulietti et al. (2014, p. 561)
argue that “search is perceived by consumers as being significantly more difficult than switching.”
Similarly, Hortacsu et al. (2017) mention for the Texas retail electricity market that switching
is a relatively easy process (without monetary costs) and that search costs are the fundamental
10
Figure 2: Potential gains from search (2012)
Finally, retail electricity can be considered a fairly homogeneous product17 and
for the consumers there are no retailer specific differences regarding the quality of
supply. If an entrant fails to deliver, the incumbent provider has the legal obligation
to guarantee the continuing electricity supply at the baseline tariff for the affected
consumers without any temporary interruption. However, not all consumers may
be aware of this safety net.18 Hence, theoretically it should not matter for the end-
consumer which retailer delivers the electricity, although to some extent it still may
matter in practice, equipping the incumbent with some brand value.
driver of consumer inertia. In contrast, in other markets switching fees may be substantial. For
example, in the US cable TV market, consumers have to pay for upfront installations and equipment
(Shcherbakov, 2016).
17The main product differentiating feature is the differentiation between regular tariffs and
“green” tariffs, which exclusively sell electricity produced by renewable sources such as wind, solar
or run-of-river plants. In the empirical analysis, we omit consumers that only search for green cer-
tified tariffs. However, such consumers only present a very small share of all searching consumers
(approximately 3%) and our results stay fully robust once we include them.
18The German incumbent is one of the most reliable electricity providers worldwide. For example,
the average SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) measuring the average supply
interruption per household, was only 12.3 minutes in Germany in 2014, one of the best values
worldwide. To date, there have been only two insolvencies of German incumbents (Stadtwerke
Gera and Stadtwerke Wanzleben, both in 2014). Consumers were not affected, at least insofar as
electricity supply continued during the insolvency procedures. Hortacsu et al. (2017) mention the
possibility that customers may believe that the incumbent supplier may exhibit a higher supply
security although this is in fact not true.
11
Figure 3: Average tariffs and costs (e/year for 3,500 kWh)
Note: Prices (P IH , P
I
L, P
E) and costs (C) are presented net of value added taxes.
As other prices than the incumbent base tariff can only be observed by consumers
who proactively search, an incumbent is able to set alternative tariffs online for con-
sumers who engage in search, and in this way price discriminate between consumers
with low and high search costs. The incumbent’s online tariff is typically set below
the baseline tariff but still above the cheapest overall tariff set by an entrant. Figure
3 shows that there are considerable price differences between the incumbent’s base-
line tariff (i.e. price incumbent high, P IH), the incumbent’s cheapest tariff (i.e. price
incumbent low, P IL), and the overall cheapest entrant tariff (i.e. price entrant, P
E).
We focus on the cheapest entrant price, assuming that consumers who switch away
from the incumbent most likely choose the cheapest tariff available.19 As a result,
we observe three forms of price dispersion: (i) Overall price dispersion (P IH − PE),
which is the difference between the incumbent’s baseline tariff and the overall cheap-
est tariff; (ii) price discrimination by the incumbent (P IH − P IL), measured by the
difference between the incumbent’s baseline tariff and the incumbent’s cheaper on-
line tariff; and (iii) online price dispersion measured by the difference between the
incumbent’s cheaper tariff and the cheapest entrant tariff (P IL − PE).20
19Our assumption that the majority of consumers may switch to the cheapest price of an al-
ternative supplier (given their brand loyalty is low enough to switch away from the incumbent) is
also supported in the theoretical and empirical literature. Giulietti et al. (2014) state that “in the
absence of search costs, someone who switches will choose the cheapest alternative, other things
equal.” Hence, at a tariff comparison platform, a consumer faces a list of all available tariffs starting
with the cheapest and thus may also choose the cheapest tariff. Corroborating empirical evidence
stems, e.g., from Baye et al. (2006), who estimate that an online retailer selling handheld PCs
– a product that is significantly more differentiated than retail electricity – receives 60% more
clicks by being cheapest relative to being second-cheapest on a UK online comparison platform (i.e.
Kelkoo.com) in 2003.
20We employ the price range as our dispersion measure, which is a commonly used measure in
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Figure 3 also depicts the (approximated) costs of retailers.21 We see that costs
and prices have increased over time (mostly due to increased taxes and levies to
finance the integration of renewables). Evidently, even nearly two decades after
the retail liberalization in the industry, the incumbent baseline tariff remains well
above costs. Moreover, the figure emphasizes that incumbents price discriminate by
setting a high baseline price for their consumers with high search costs and a lower
price for consumers with lower search costs who may consider leaving. However, we
observe that the cheaper incumbent’s price is still well above costs. By contrast, the
cheapest tariffs set by a entrants are very close to marginal costs. Despite having
a liberalized market with free consumer choice for nearly 20 years, a large share
of consumers (around 76%, as stated in the introduction) stays with an expensive
incumbent tariff and tariffs remain highly dispersed.
3 Identification of the Effects of Consumer Search on
Pricing
To examine the effect of consumer search intensity on pricing strategies, we first
explain our identification strategy and then describe our data and results. The
relationship we are interested in can be described by a model of the form:
ln(yit) = β ln(µit) + γxit + δi + ηt + it, (1)
where the subscripts i and t indicate zip codes and years, respectively. The depen-
dent variable y either denotes an electricity tariff (P IH , P
I
L, P
E) or a price difference
measure (P IH−PE , P IH−P IL, P IL−PE) and is a function of consumer search intensity
(µ), a set of control variables (x) including (logged) regional electricity costs, the
number of regional electricity retailers, and some regional household characteristics
such as income and average household size. Both search intensity and prices (but
also costs) exhibit substantial spatial and temporal variation, which enables us to
control for unobserved heterogeneity by zip code (δi) and year (ηt) fixed effects that
may co-influence pricing strategies.  is the random error term.
Since we only observe consumer search at the online portals represented in our
sample, but not all consumer search activity (i.e., we do not observe search activity
on all existing platforms), we estimate constant elasticities in a log-log relationship.
That is, we include the dependent variables (i.e. tariffs and dispersion measures)
as well as search intensity in logs indicating by how much a percentage change in
the literature (Baye et al., 2006). In our case, the price range best reflects the potential gains from
search.
21In Section 4, we discuss our approach to approximate retailers’ costs.
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search impacts the dependent variable in percentage terms. Assuming that search
patterns at other major comparison websites are not different from search at the
platforms that we observe in our data, the elasticity estimate allows us to make
inferences about the whole market.22 Hence, our parameter of interest β reflects the
percentage change in pricing behavior for a one percent change in search activity.23
As consumers may search more if they expect higher gains from searching when
prices are high and/or more dispersed (e.g. Tappata, 2009; Yang and Ye, 2008),
there potentially is a reverse causal relationship between prices and search intensity.
Therefore, we instrument for consumer search intensity µ using two instruments.
Our first instrument is the share of young households in a zip code measured as
the share of households with a household head below the age of 40 (U40 ). The
underlying idea is that younger people are probably more familiar with the internet
in general and with online shopping in particular. As a second instrument, we
employ the regional availability of broadband internet (BBA), measured as the share
of households in a zip code for which an internet speed of 16 Mbit/s is offered for
their local address. The idea here is that fast internet makes online shopping more
convenient.24
Using these instruments, we estimate the following linear projection of µ in the
first-stage:
ln(µit) = αzit + γ
FSxit + δ
FS
i + η
FS
t + uit, (2)
where the vector z consists of our two instruments U40 and BBA. The superscript
FS indicates that the parameters are from the first-stage estimation. Plugging the
first-stage prediction of search (i.e. l̂n(µ)) into Equation (1) should yield unbiased
estimates for β.
The critical assumption is that both instruments affect pricing strategies only
through the search channel. However, as young people may also have less income,
which in turn may affect pricing decisions (e.g. retailers may face a higher risk of
shortfalls of payments by younger customers) we also control for income. As income
is included in x, we assume that the instrument vector z is uncorrelated with the
22The assumption that the searching patterns we observe are similar across platforms is reason-
able: We also have data on consumer search at Verivox – another major price comparison platform
in Germany – for the year 2014; however the data are only provided as percentages of search in a
respective zip code relative to the overall search in Germany, which is why we cannot merge these
data with our actual search data. We find a correlation coefficient of 85% between search intensity
at Verivox and the platforms we use here, indicating that search at Verivox does not seem to differ
much from search observed in our dataset.
23However, the estimations are fully robust if estimated in levels, as we show later.
24We will also experiment with alternative internet speeds in the robustness section.
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error term  in Equation 1 such that
E(itzit|δi, ηt,xit) = 0.
Moreover, it may be that broadband internet availability affects electricity de-
mand or that younger households consume more or less than older households. How-
ever, we believe that these demand effects do not translate into direct pricing effects
in retail electricity markets since electricity demand is highly inelastic. To tackle
remaining doubts regarding our identification strategy, we apply an alternative set
of instruments in the spirit of Hausman and Taylor (1981). That is, we use average
values of the instruments in the 50 surrounding zip codes (while disregarding the
actual zip code i) as alternative instruments. Thus, even if our instruments were
to directly affect prices in some way, their values from neighboring zip codes should
not, although they should still be correlated with the values in the respective zip
code itself.25 The results are fully robust to these alternative instruments, as we
show in the robustness section.
4 Data and Variables
We use panel data at the German zip code level for the period 2011–2014.26 A key
asset of our data is the information about local online search queries at major price
comparison portals, which enables us to construct a direct measure of consumer
search. Another particular advantage is that we do not have to make assumptions
about market delineation, as consumers at retail electricity markets can only choose
among electricity suppliers that sell to their local address.
The data stem from four sources. From ene’t, a German software and data
provider for the electricity industry, we received detailed data on individual con-
sumer searches at several online price comparison sites as well as retail electricity
tariffs and cost components. The database marketing company Acxiom provided
data on structural household characteristics in Germany. We also use data from
the European Energy Exchange (EEX) to obtain a proxy for the purchase costs of
wholesale electricity (as a component of utilities’ total costs). Moreover, we use data
25The share of young households (U40) in neighboring zip codes should be correlated with the zip
code of observation due to demographic effects (e.g. trends in migration, existence of a university,
etc.). Also, broadband availability (BBA) in zip code i is correlated with BBA in neighboring zip
codes, e.g. due to regional roll-out.
26We have 8,226 zip codes in our data. However, there is an overlap of incumbency areas in
some of the zip codes. For instance, A is the incumbent in one part of a zip code while B is the
incumbent in the other part of the same zip code. We drop all zip codes which have more than
one incumbent, which reduces the number of zip codes in our data to 7,249. However, the results
we present later only change marginally if we also include these zip codes into our data and use
averages of the different incumbent prices.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Unit, data source Mean SD Min Max Obs
Dependent variables
Incumbent’s baseline price (P IH) e/a, ene’t 1,006 78.1 800 1,204 25,861
Incumbent’s cheapest tariff (P IL) e/a, ene’t 929 86.7 716 1,117 25,861
Entrant’s overall cheapest tariff (PE) e/a, ene’t 808 59.0 667 903 25,861
Overall price dispersion (P IH − PE) e/a, ene’t 199 38.9 77 354 25,861
Price discrimination (P IH − P IL) e/a, ene’t 77 41.6 0 282 25,861
Onlince price dispersion (P IL − PE) e/a, ene’t 122 46.5 0 259 25,861
Endogenous variable
Consumer search intensity (µ) %, ene’t 9.23 6.3 0 34.7 25,861
Instruments
Head of HH below age of 40 (U40) %, Acxiom 24.7 5.2 8.4 55.1 25,861
Broadband internet availability (BBA) %, breitbandatlas.de 63.8 32.3 0 100 25,861
Control variables
Net costs e/a, ene’t & EEX 683 42.3 560 823 25,861
Competitors #, ene’t 133 25 55 192 25,861
Average HH size %, Acxiom 2.11 0.2 1.52 2.54 25,861
Income <25k e/a %, Axciom 0.39 0.1 0.02 0.83 25,861
Note: “Obs” are zip code-year observations. e/a refers to an annual electricity consumption of 3.5
MWh.
on regional broadband internet availability from breitbandatlas.de.
As mentioned in the section above, consumers typically have yearly contracts and
we therefore aggregate all data at the yearly level. Table 1 provides the summary
statistics of the variables in our regressions. In Table A1 in the Appendix, we
additionally report the between and within standard deviations of our key variables.
Prices
ene’t provided all tariff data for P IH , P
I
L and P
E . For P IH and P
E we have monthly
data. We use the yearly averages as our variable for these prices. For P IL the
initial data are yearly average prices already. In the estimations we use gross prices
(including 19% VAT) since they present the relevant price for end-consumers, and is
displayed accordingly in the search platforms. In the empirical application we focus
on a typical two-person household with an annual consumption level of 3,500 kWh.
This is the default consumption level suggested by all major price comparison sites
for a two-person household.27
Table 1 shows that, on average, a household with 3,500 kWh annual consumption
of electricity pays around 1,006 EUR per year if it stays with the incumbent’s default
273,500 kWh is also the household consumption level that is typically applied by other agencies
(e.g. (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015) for comparing retail tariffs. ene’t also provided tariff data for other
annual consumption levels (2,000 kWh and 4,000 kWh), however only for P IH and P
E (not for P IL).
Regression estimates using P IH and P
E as well as P IH −PE for alternative consumption levels yield
robust results.
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tariff. The incumbent’s cheaper tariff is around 8% lower at 929 EUR, while the
overall cheapest entrant tariff is around 808 EUR (which is 20% cheaper than the
incumbent default tariff). All prices exhibit substantial variation in our observation
period regarding their spatial and time dimensions. Figure A2 in the Appendix
shows the spatial distribution of the incumbents’ baseline tariffs for the year 2012.
From the figure it can be seen that prices are generally higher in eastern and northern
Germany. The main reason is that grid charges are higher there because of the
many wind farms in these areas. Figure A4 in the Appendix shows the spatial
cost distribution. We accommodate these patterns in the empirical analysis by
controlling for variations in costs at the zip code level (the data we use to compute
costs are described in the subsection on the control variables below) and we also
add zip code fixed effects. Notably, the price data also provide substantial temporal
variation. This is shown for the incumbent base tariffs in Appendix Figure A3 but is
also very similar for the other tariffs. The between and within standard deviations
of the prices are also reported in A1 in the Appendix. Moreover, there is significant
variation in the identity of the entrant offering the lowest tariff across zip codes
and time. In our observation period, there are 182 different retailers that have the
cheapest overall price in a zip code for at least one month. Moreover, in a zip code
there are on average 14.4 different retailers that have the cheapest price in at least
one month during our observation period. On average a retailer is the cheapest for
2.2 consecutive months. Overall this suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity
and variation over time in the cheapest firm.28
Consumer Search
ene’t provided data on individual online search queries, enabling us to construct
data on regional consumer search intensity. The database covers detailed infor-
mation on all search queries conducted at several well-known online price compari-
son platforms including Toptarif.de (top-tariff), Stromtipp.de (power-hint), Energie-
verbraucherportal.de (energy-consumer-portal), and mut-zum-wechseln.de (courage-
to-change), of which Toptarif.de is by far the largest platform.29 For each query,
we observe a timestamp, the zip code for which the offered electricity tariffs are
requested, the (expected) yearly consumption entered into the interface, the type of
search query (household or industrial customer), consumer preferences (e.g. whether
a consumer only wants to get energy tariffs having a “green” certificate displayed),
as well as a search session ID indicating the order of the queries from the same con-
28This is in line with the following possible dynamic pricing strategy of entrants: they may try
to attract consumers using the lowest price in the market and then raise their prices in subsequent
periods, hoping consumers will not switch again.
29Toptarif is one of the three major electricity and gas price comparison websites, along with
Verivox and Check24. It was acquired by Verivox in July 2014 but continues to operate as Toptarif.
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sumer.30 In sum, we have information on 35,855,071 search queries from 17,302,530
search sessions of which 96.7% (i.e. 16,778,214 sessions) are conducted by households
and the remaining 3.3% (i.e. 524,316 sessions) by industrial customers. As many
searchers conduct several search queries within a search session (e.g. comparing
prices for different levels of consumption) we focus on the number of search sessions
per year and zip code rather than on the absolute number of search queries and
refer to a consumer conducting a search session as being fully informed regardless
of the depth of the search activity.31 Since our focus is on household consumers, we
disregard search by industrial consumers. Furthermore, we exclude 551,256 search
sessions, which exclusively consider eco-label (i.e. “green”) certified tariffs.32 Those
searches are most likely not predominantly price driven but related to product dif-
ferentiation and, on average, e152 more expensive than the cheapest tariff.
We construct our measure of search intensity as the number of search sessions
within a zip code per year divided by the number of households:
µit =
SearchSessionsit
Householdsit
.
Since we observe some extreme outliers in some zip codes, apparently resulting from
price comparing software “bots” or data crawling researchers, we truncate 2% of the
upper bound of the sample distribution of our consumer information measure.33
At the mean, 9.1% of households within a zip code search for retail tariffs at one
of our sample comparison websites, whereas there is substantial variation ranging
from 0% to 34.7%. An illustration of the spatial variation of search intensity is given
in Appendix Figure A5. Moreover, Table A1 shows that there is also substantial
within zip code variation.
Instruments
The data on the share of young households, i.e., households with a household head
younger than 40 (U40 ), are obtained from Acxiom at a zip code-year resolution.
Data on local broadband internet availability (BBA), which is the share of house-
holds for which internet speeds of 16 MBit/s or higher are offered, are obtained from
30We are not able to observe actual switching, because clicking on a certain supplier tariff at the
online comparison website redirects the searcher to a website where the switch may be finalized.
This limitation is common to online data (see Koulayev, 2014). Yet, switching requires searching, so
the impact of consumer search on price strategies seems to be consistently estimable. Brynjolfsson
and Smith (2001) confirm this and find that factors that drive clicks are reasonable and unbiased
indicators of sales, in their study on online book purchases.
31It should also be noted that a search session only contains the current search activity of an
individual household and we cannot distinguish whether the same household starts a new search
session on another date. Therefore, we treat each search session as conducted by an individual
household.
32Nevertheless, our results are fully robust to the inclusion of eco-label searches.
33Figure A6 in the Appendix provides a histogram on consumer information before and after
trimming the data.
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Breitbandatlas.de with the same resolution. The BBA data are at the municipal level
and we aggregate them to the zip code level to match them with our remaining data.
We choose the 16 MBit/s as it provides substantial variation and gives the best first-
stage F -statistic of excluded instruments. A speed of, for example, 1 Mbit/s was
available in more than 90% of all zip codes in 2011 and is actually too slow to use the
internet conveniently. A spped faster than 16 Mbit/s has a very low coverage and for
most applications does not make internet usage significantly more convenient than
16Mbit/s; at least not during the period 2011–2014. An alternative would have been
to use 6 Mbit/s. In this case, the first-stage F -test is a little lower but the results
do not change much.34 BBA exhibits considerable within zip code variation while
it is less pronounced for U40, as shown in Table A1.
Control Variables
We compute a variable reflecting retailers’ costs in order to control for regional cost
differences. Detailed data on cost components are primarily obtained from ene’t
and include, for example, grid charges, concession fees, renewable energy surcharges
(“EEG Umlage”), CHP (combined heat and power) surcharges (“KWK Umlage”)
and electricity taxes. Grid charges are paid by the electricity provider to the re-
spective system operator and, thus, vary across grid areas (i.e. clusters of zip codes)
and time as they are adjusted annually. The concession fee has to be paid by the
system operator to the respective municipality for the right to install and operate
electric cables on public roads. Hence, the concession fees vary at the municipality
level and also over time. The remaining cost components only vary over time but
not spatially. Moreover, we also add the one-year ahead future prices at the EEX
spot market to our cost variable to proxy for the costs of wholesale electricity, as
this one-year ahead price presents the standard purchasing strategy for retailers.35
To measure competition within the zip code, we use the number of electricity
retail suppliers in the zip code, as provided by ene’t. The number of competitors in
a zip code varies between 55 and 198 in our observation period.36 Moreover, as can
be inferred from Table A1 in the Appendix, the within zip code standard deviation
is 19.8, suggesting that there is also a significant fluctuation of retailers within a zip
code over time.
Other control variables refer to structural household characteristics, which we
obtained from Acxiom. The average household size (HH size) may represent an
indication of the composition of households in a zip code. The share of households
34These results are available in the Appendix Tables A23 and A26.
35Even if retailers purchase electricity through other channels than via the power exchange (e.g.
bilateral contracts, OTC, etc.), the price from the power exchange still represents the opportunity
cost.
36These numbers may seem high but correspond well with Bundesnetzagentur (2015) and may
be the consequence of low entry barriers in the electricity retail market in Germany.
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with an annual income of less than e25,000 (Income <25k e/a) may be relevant, as
low incomes may increase the risk of a consumer’s payment default.
5 Results
In Table 2, we present the results from our IV estimations for the three retail prices
of interest, P IH , P
I
L and P
E . As we do not have information on all price comparison
sites, we use a log-log specification to be able to interpret the coefficients as elas-
ticities.37 The instruments are sufficiently strongly correlated with the endogenous
variable as shown by the high values of the first-stage F -test. Also, the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test suggests that the consumer search intensity µ should indeed be
treated as endogenous as the null hypothesis of consumer search being an exogenous
regressor is clearly rejected. The first-stage results for all IV estimations in the paper
(i.e. log-log, level-level, with and without control variables) are reported in Table
A2 in the Appendix.38
Coming to the results, column 1 of Table 2 provides evidence that the incumbent
reacts to a higher search intensity by slightly increasing its baseline tariff. For
a change in consumer search intensity by 10%, the incumbent raises its tariff by
0.38%. Thus, while we theoretically show in Section 6 that the effect of search
intensity on the incumbent base price can go either way depending on exactly how
the search cost distribution changes and on the loyalty of consumers, empirically
we find a positive effect. Column 2 shows in contrast that the incumbent reacts to
more search activity in its zip code by reducing its cheaper online tariff considerably.
For a 10% increase in search activity, the incumbent decreases its cheapest tariff by
1.16%. Moreover, column 3 reveals that the overall cheapest tariff in the market
provided by an entrant supplier also decreases with more consumer search, whereas
the effect is less pronounced with the incumbents’ cheapest tariffs. For every 10%
increase in search intensity in a zip code the overall cheapest tariff in the market
decreases by 0.32%. Thus, the incumbents’ cheapest tariffs react more strongly to
consumer search than the overall cheapest tariff.
The empirical effects can be explained along the lines of Proposition 2, presented
in the next Section discussing the theoretical model. If there are more low search
cost consumers, then there will be more competition online and thus lower prices.
To prevent too many consumers from switching to the entrant, the incumbent has to
decrease its online price more aggressively than the entrants: the incumbent would
37However, the results are fully robust to level-level specifications as shown in Table A7.
38For information purposes, we also provide results from OLS panel estimations in Tables A3 and
A4 in the Appendix. The direction of the sign and the significance are as in the IV estimations but
the magnitudes are much lower, suggesting that neglecting endogeneity leads to an underestimation
of the impact of consumer search on pricing.
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Table 2: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base: Incumbent Cheapest: Overall Cheapest:
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ ) 0.038*** -0.116*** -0.032***
(0.009) (0.025) (0.007)
Costs 0.238*** 0.474*** 0.531***
(0.011) (0.026) (0.009)
#Competitors 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.024*** 0.054** 0.005
(0.008) (0.023) (0.006)
Income <25k e/a 0.009 -0.069*** -0.007
(0.008) (0.018) (0.006)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F stat. 23.67 23.67 23.67
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
lose a larger markup when losing a customer as the incumbents’ cheapest prices
are higher than the overall cheapest prices in the market. At the same time, if
there is still a considerable fraction of consumers with high enough search costs, the
incumbent has an incentive to increase the margin on its baseline tariff as it will not
lose too many consumers by doing so relative to the loyal consumers.
We now briefly explain the impact of the other control variables. We estimate
the cost pass-through to the end-user retail tariffs, which is much higher in the
competitive segments of the electricity retail market. For the incumbents’ baseline
tariffs, we estimate a pass-through of only around 24%, whereas 48% of cost increases
are passed on to consumers for the incumbents’ cheapest tariffs and 53% for the
cheapest entrants’ tariffs. The different pass-through patterns are in line with Duso
and Szu¨cs (2017), who investigate pass-through in the German electricity retail
markets and also find that incumbents pass-through costs to a lesser extent.
Average household size increases all tariffs. The reaction of the incumbent’s
baseline tariff to a larger share of low-income households (Income < 25k e/year) is
statistically insignificant, whereas the incumbent reacts with a significant decrease
in its cheaper online tariff. To a lesser extent, the same is true for the cheapest
entrant. This may imply that price sensitive consumers may not be willing to pay
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a high online price to stay with the incumbent at a higher tariff compared to the
overall cheapest tariff, so that the incumbent has to approach the overall cheapest
tariff with its competitive online price.
Possibly surprisingly, the number of competitors positively affects all prices.
However, the estimated effect of an additional competitor on prices is close to zero
and thus economically negligible. Given low entry barriers and the already high
number of competitors, it seems that additional entry does not have an economically
significant impact on prices.39
Table 3 presents estimations of the impact of consumer search on the three price
dispersion measures. Column 1 focuses on overall price dispersion, measured as the
incumbent’s baseline tariff (P IH) minus the overall cheapest tariff (P
E). Evidently,
price dispersion goes up if more consumers search, since the incumbent slightly
increases its baseline tariff and at the same time the overall cheapest price declines
with search: more search in a zip code region may indicate a larger relative mass
of consumers with low in contrast to intermediate search costs, which prompts the
incumbent to increase its baseline tariff, while tariffs in the competitive segment
decline due to increased competitive pressure. For every 10% increase in search
intensity, the extent of price dispersion goes up by 2.7%, suggesting that consumers’
gain from searching increases with the share of searching consumers.
Incumbents react to increased price pressure from consumer search via price dis-
crimination, as they offer a cheaper tariff for searching consumers, which is still above
the overall cheapest tariff in the market, and a high incumbent baseline tariff for
loyal consumers who do not search. Price discrimination becomes more pronounced
with increasing search intensity. An increase in the share of searching consumers by
10% widens the gap between the incumbent’s baseline tariff and its cheaper tariff by
13.7%. The extent of price discrimination unambiguously increases if a larger share
of consumers searches, predominantly because the incumbent decreases its cheapest
tariff significantly as a reaction to consumer search to aggressively prevent existing
customers from switching to competitors. This can be explained in line with Propo-
sition 1 of our theoretical model in the next section: more searching consumers imply
more price discrimination if there are relatively sufficient many consumers left who
are loyal and “always” buy at the baseline price of the incumbent.
We also see that online price dispersion, measured as the difference between the
incumbent’s cheapest tariff and the overall cheapest tariff in the market, narrows
39Regardless of this, these coefficients have to be interpreted with caution, as they may not
reflect causal effects: prices and number of competitors may influence each other. In the robustness
section, we also present results from estimations where we additionally instrument for the number
of competitors using Hausman-type instruments (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) but the results only
change marginally. Moreover, all results stay fully robust if we drop all covariates, as shown in
Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix.
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Table 3: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ ) 0.272*** 1.368*** -1.361***
(0.057) (0.340) (0.356)
Costs -0.967*** -1.911*** -0.100
(0.067) (0.325) (0.360)
#Competitors 0.002*** -0.042*** 0.066***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Average HH size 0.107** 0.064 1.839***
(0.055) (0.294) (0.328)
Income <25k e/a 0.093 0.750*** -0.948***
(0.065) (0.240) (0.274)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F stat. F stat. 23.67 23.67 23.67
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
considerably with search intensity. The more consumers search in a market, the more
the incumbent is forced to approach the overall cheapest price. For a 10% increase
in search intensity, the “loyalty premium” narrows by 13.6%. The premium the
incumbent can charge over and above the cheapest tariff in the market is larger the
more consumers are willing to pay for the services of the incumbent. These results
are in line with Proposition 3 below, where we explain that in zip codes where more
consumers search the incumbent decreases its online price more aggressively than
the entrants as he would lose a larger markup when losing a customer. This implies
increased competition and less online price dispersion.
Overall, we find that the loyal consumers who stay with the incumbent’s baseline
tariff get milked when there are more searching consumers in a local market. In
contrast, those who are willing to search either get a cheaper incumbent tariff, which
includes a brand premium compared to the overall cheapest tariff in the market, or
switch to a cheaper entrant tariff. The incumbent reacts to more consumer search
with price discrimination by slightly increasing its baseline tariff while at the same
time drastically reducing its cheaper online tariff. Entrants react to more search
with somewhat lower prices, giving rise to increasing overall price dispersion and
price discrimination, as well as increasing the alignment of incumbent and entrant
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prices in the competitive online segment.
Robustness Checks
The above results are robust to a large variety of alternative specifications as shown
below.
Level-Level Estimation
In the main specification, we focus on log-log specifications to allow interpretion of
the results as elasticities. However, the results remain fully robust if we run level-
level specifications of the models. They are reported in Tables A7 and A8 in the
Appendix.
Non-Linear Effect of Search on Prices
We now allow for a non-linear relationship between search and prices, by adding a µ2
in Equation 1. We instrument for µ2 by using the square of the first-stage estimate
of µ from Equation 2 as the instrument for µ2 (see Wooldridge (2010, p. 262) on
this approach). The results remain robust and are reported in the Appendix Tables
A9 and A10. A graphical illustration is provided in Graph A7 of the Appendix.
Alternative Outcome Variables
We also estimate models with different outcome variables. In the first set of these
models (Appendix Tables A11 and A12), we estimate the impact of search on retail-
ers’ markups for different tariffs and on differences in these markups. We compute
markups as the differences between (net) prices and costs. In the second set (Tables
A13 and A14) we use Lerner Indices as the dependent variables. They are computed
as the ratio of markups to prices.40 The results for markups and Lerner Indices are
as one would expect from the results of the price estimations.
Alternative Instruments
Though we do not assume that our instruments BBA and U40 are correlated with
the error term in Equation 1, we still apply a robustness check in which we use the
average values of the instruments in the 50 surrounding zip codes (while disregarding
the actual zip code of observation i) as alternative instruments. This is in the spirit
of Hausman and Taylor (1981), who use average values of the endogenous variable
in surrounding areas as instruments. In contrast, our approach uses average values
of the initial instrument as a new instrument. The results are fully robust to these
alternative instruments and are shown in the Appendix Tables A15 and A16.
Additionally Instrumenting for the Number of Competitors
40As there are also negative values for the markups and Lerner Indices, we do the log-
transformation on the absolute values and put the sign back after that.
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The prices and the number of competitors may affect each other. In order to test
if potential endogeneity of the number of competitors affects our results, we also
instrument for the number of firms in a zip code by using the average number of
firms in the surrounding 50 zip codes in the spirit of Hausman and Taylor (1981).
There is sufficient variation regarding the number of firms in the zip code itself and
the surrounding 50 zip codes: we observe an absolute difference between the former
and the latter of 7 and also a standard deviation of 7. The results only change
marginally, as shown in Tables A17 and A18 in the Appendix, suggesting robustness
of our results to instrumenting for the number of competitors.
Alternative Clustering of Standard Errors
Many incumbents operate only locally and 46% of the incumbents only have a single
zip code in their incumbency area. These small incumbents are mostly municipal
utilities. However, larger incumbents often have several zip codes in their incum-
bency area and charge locally differing baseline tariffs. The different price zones
are not necessarily at the zip code level.41 Hence, as a robustness check, we cluster
standard errors in two alternative ways. In the first version, we allow the residuals
to correlate within incumbent prices zones and cluster standard errors at that level,
instead of the zip code level (see Appendix Tables A19 and A20). In the second
version, the clustering is at the incumbency area level (see Appendix Tables A21
and A22). In both cases the results remain fully robust.
6 A simple search theoretic model
In this Section, we consider a simple model to (i) show that the empirical findings
are perfectly compatible with the essential incentives of the electricity providers
and consumers and (ii) to provide a counterfactual analysis of a scenario where
electricity providers are not allowed to price discriminate between online platforms
and traditional marketing channels. The model applies to any liberalized market
where an incumbent firm competes with entrants for a homogeneous product and
the incumbent is able to price discriminate between searching and loyal consumers.
The model closely follows the institutional details described above. All con-
sumers observe the regular (baseline) price P IH of the incumbent at no additional
cost.42 There is an online price comparison website consumers can consult at a
41See Section 2 for more details.
42Note that our model is static and treats incumbents and entrants as asymmetric. In real
markets, the following dynamic aspects may be important: once some consumers have switched to
entrants, they later gain some incumbency effect as these consumers will have to search if they want
to switch away from their provider. Thus, over time entrants and incumbents may become more
symmetric to each other. In the theoretical model, we have abstracted from these considerations as
individual entrants in the German electricity market typically have a very small market share. In
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search cost s, which is distributed according to a distribution function F (s; z), with
support [0, 1], where we use z to represent exogenous parameters that determine
the shape of the search cost distribution. (In the empirical part of the paper, z are
the instruments that are exogenous to the prices across regions, but that do affect
differences in search behavior across different zip codes). At the website, consumers
will see potentially many prices, but (in line with the data we have) we are only
interested in two of them: the price PE of the overall cheapest firm (usually an
entrant) and the cheapest (online) price P IL of the incumbent. We assume that once
on the website, a consumer compares prices without additional search cost.
Apart from their search cost, consumers also have some brand loyalty to the
incumbent. Brand loyalty will also differ between individuals. Not to complicate
the analysis too much (and not to deal with two different distributions for search
cost and brand loyalty), we assume that brand loyalty is proportional to search cost
and say that the brand loyalty of a consumer with search cost s is denoted by θs,
with θ < 1. One way to interpret this would be that consumers with higher search
costs will be older and more wealthy consumers who do not want to risk their stable
delivery of electricity by switching and are more loyal to the incumbent.43 Once a
consumer with search cost s is online and observes both prices PE and P IL then he
will continue to buy from the incumbent if P IL − θs < PE .
The sequence of actions is as follows. In the first-stage, the incumbent and
entrant choose P IH , P
I
L and P
E simultaneously.44 At the beginning of the second-
stage, consumers only observe P IH and decide whether or not to search (given their
expectations of the online prices). If they do not search they buy at P IH from the
incumbent. If they do search, then they buy where it is best for them. We use perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs as our solution concept. In particular, if
a consumer observes an unexpected price P IH (different from the equilibrium level),
then he will continue to believe that P IL and P
E are at their equilibrium levels.
This model abstracts from possible dynamic considerations and from the inter-
action between many entrants. In the different local electricity markets in Germany,
nearly twenty years after the first market liberalization, entrants are likely to have
built up some small groups of more or less loyal consumers, giving them some market
power as well. On the other hand, entrants also compete with each other, which
Table 1, we report that on average there are more than 130 firms active in every zip code, though
the incumbent provider continues to have around 76% market share. This implies that on average
entrants have less than 0.2% market share.
43Even though the entrant is also a stable supplier, there still may be a psychological element
that the incumbent in Europe has always been a stable, high quality supplier.
44In the Appendix, we consider an alternative “Stackelberg” version of the model where the
incumbent first chooses its baseline price P IH , and P
I
L and P
E are chosen at the moment P IH is
given and observed by the entrant. In this case, online prices (and consumer expectations of them)
react to the baseline price and the incumbent takes this reaction into account when setting P IH .
The qualitative results do not change, however.
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clearly lowers this incumbency effect. In our model, we have only one entrant (as,
in our data, we observe only the lowest entrants’ price) without loyal consumers. If
the entrants’ incumbency and competition effect in the real market are of the same
order of magnitude, our static model is a reasonable approximation of the market
we intend to describe.
We will be looking for an equilibrium where the low search cost consumers
search online and the high search cost consumers stay with the baseline price of
the incumbent. Of the consumers that search online, the ones with very low brand
loyalty (and thus also low search cost) buy from the entrant, while other online con-
sumers buy from the incumbent at its cheapest (online) price. The ex ante utility
of a consumer with search cost s to buy at the three different prices is given by
v − PE − s, v − P IL + (θ − 1)s and v − P IH + θs if he buys from the entrant, the
online price of the incumbent and the baseline price of the incumbent, respectively.
In such an equilibrium, the cut-off values for search costs are ŝ1 =
(
P IL − PE
)
/θ and
ŝ2 =
(
P IH − pI
e
L
)
such that all consumers with s < ŝ1 buy from the entrant, all con-
sumers with ŝ1 < s < ŝ2 buy at the online price of the incumbent and all consumers
with s > ŝ2 buy at the regular price of the incumbent. Note that in the definition
of ŝ2 we have P
Ie
L , the online price of the incumbent that consumers expect to find
if they search, but before engaging in search, and not the actual online price of the
incumbent: when deciding whether or not to search, the consumer does not know
yet which online price he will observe and therefore the expectation is relevant.45
Note also that we do not have to deal with expected prices in the definition of ŝ1
because these are consumers that are indifferent between buying at one or the other
online prices, which implies they are already at the website, have incurred the search
cost, and observe both prices.
In this theory section we assume, without loss of generality, that the firms have
no supply cost. The equilibrium prices we derive can therefore be interpreted as the
margins firms make. Given this division of consumers, the respective profits of the
entrant and incumbent are as follows:
piE = F (ŝ1; z)P
E = F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
PE
and
45To determine the equilibrium value of P IL and P
I
H it is important that a consumer will not
observe a deviation from P IL before the decision whether or not to search is made.
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piI = [F (ŝ2; z)− F (ŝ1; z)]P IL + (1− F (ŝ2; z))P IH
=
[
F (P IH − pI
e
L ; z)− F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)]
P IL + (1− F (P IH − pI
e
L ); z)P
I
H .
This yields the following F.O.C.s (evaluated at the equilibrium where P IeL = P
I
L)
for the entrant and the incumbent, respectively:
F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
− f
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
PE
θ
= 0, (3)
F (P IH − P IL; z)− F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
− f
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
P IL
θ
= 0, (4)
and
− f(P IH − P IL; z)(P IH − P IL) + (1− F (P IH − P IL; z)) = 0, (5)
where f(.) is the density function that is associated with F (.). Note that the fraction
of actively searching consumers is given by F (P IH − P IL; z).
For a given z, these three F.O.C.s determine the equilibrium values of P I
∗
H , P
I∗
L
and PE
∗
and the associated levels of price discrimination and price dispersion and
the fraction of active searchers.46 To explain differences in the observed level of
price discrimination and price dispersion and the fraction of active searchers between
regions, we have to see how the equilibrium levels of prices change with changes in
z.
The next result provides a general statement on the conditions affecting price
discrimination and online price dispersion. The effects of the loyalty parameter θ are
clear-cut: all prices and online price dispersion are increasing in θ, whereas overall
price dispersion is decreasing and price discrimination is unaffected. The effects of
changes in the search cost distribution, reflected by changes in the parameter z, are
more rich and different patterns are possible.
Proposition 1 The effects of an increase in brand loyalty θ is that all prices and
online price dispersion increase, while overall price dispersion decreases and price
discrimination is unaffected. The effects of changes in the parameters underlying
the search cost distribution z are as follows. Price discrimination increases if, and
only if, the inverse hazard rate evaluated at the equilibrium values
1−F (P I∗H −P I
∗
L ;z)
f(P I
∗
H −P I
∗
L ;z)
is
increasing in z. Moreover, PE and online price dispersion are positively related to
P IL if the density functions are non-increasing, i.e., ∂f
(
P IL−PE
θ ; z
)
/∂(P IL−PE) ≤ 0.
Finally, online price dispersion and price discrimination are linked by 1 + f(P IH −
46Asterisks indicate equilibrium values.
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P IL; z)(P
I
H − P IL) = f
(
P IL−PE
θ ; z
)(
P IL+P
E
θ
)
.
The economic intuition behind the result on price discrimination is clear: for a
given value of P IL the incumbent faces a trade-off in its decision whether or not to
increase P IH . Raising P
I
H increases the profits for all consumers 1− F (P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L ; z)
who will stay on the baseline tariff; on the other hand, a fraction proportional to
the density f(P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L ; z) will decide to search. At the margin, those that decide
to search will eventually buy at the incumbent’s online price P I
∗
L as the marginal
consumer has a higher search and switching cost. The incumbent will lose P I
∗
H −P I
∗
L
per (marginal) consumer who searches. If, evaluated at the equilibrium values,47 the
inverse hazard rate is increasing in z, relatively more consumers will stay on the
baseline tariff if z increases, making price discrimination more profitable.
Also, to understand online price dispersion, if P IL increases, then there is a larger
potential demand for the entrant and, under “normal”demand conditions, it should
increase its price, but not to the full extent (thereby also increasing sales). Online
price dispersion and price discrimination are linked by how the incumbent sets its
online price.
To investigate the determinants of price dispersion and the fraction of active
searchers, it is useful to analyze a specific form of a search cost distribution. To get
reasonably simple expressions for the F.O.C.s, we have adopted a piece-wise linear
search cost distribution:
F (s) =

zs for s < s˜1
α+ βs for s˜1 ≤ s < s˜2
s for s ≥ s˜2,
where to have a proper piece-wise linear distribution function, we should have α =
(z−1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2−s˜1 , β =
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1 and s˜2 > s˜1 and z > 0. If z = 1, we have the uniform
distribution.48 We focus on parameter values such that ŝ1 < s˜1 < ŝ2 < s˜2, i.e., the
consumer that is indifferent between two online offers is in the first interval of the
search cost distribution, while the consumer that is indifferent between searching
and not searching is in the second interval of the search cost distribution.49
47Most distributions covered in standard statistics textbooks have an inverse hazard rate that
is decreasing. Note, however, the difference: We ask the inverse hazard rate to be increasing in an
exogenous parameter z and we do not require it to be increasing over the full domain of possible
search cost values, whereas the common description is one where (1 − F (x))/f(x) is decreasing in
x.
48An exponential search cost distribution according to which F (s; z) = 1 − e−zs on s ∈ [0,∞)
would have been an alternative choice, but in that case P IH −P IL = 1/z and F (P IH −P IL) = 1− e−1,
which is independent of z. Thus, with an exponential distribution we cannot explain changes in the
fraction of searchers between regions.
49The qualitative results continue to hold if P IH −P IL > s˜2 although the specific formulas will be
different.
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Figure 4: A piece-wise linear search cost distribution
Note: An increase in z shifts the piece-wise linear search cost distribution such
that there is more mass of consumers with lower search costs.
The piece-wise linear formulation allows us to have different ways in which the
search cost distribution may tend to have more consumers with lower search cost.
The simplest formulation is in terms of z: an increase in z unambiguously leads the
search cost distribution to have more mass on consumers with lower search cost at
the expense of consumers with intermediate search cost. An increase in z is the only
way to model that the fraction of consumers with very low search cost increases.
An increase in s˜1 and/or in s˜2 also leads the search cost distribution to have more
mass on consumers with lower search cost, but if (and only if) z > 1. In addition,
increases in s˜1 or in s˜2 leave the fraction of consumers with the very lowest search
cost unchanged and only increases the fraction of consumers with more intermediate
search cost. As the instruments we used in the empirical part of the paper relate to
households having very low search cost, we will focus here on the comparative statics
with respect to z and discuss the other comparative static results in the Appendix.
It is important to note that having relatively more consumers with lower search
cost does not automatically imply that there will be more active searchers. The
number of active searchers F (P I
∗
H − P I
e
L ) is also endogenously determined by the
equilibrium prices (and the expected prices online). To determine the number of
active searchers, we first determine the level of price discrimination P I
∗
H − P I
e
L .
Using (5) it is easy to see that for the case where the search cost distribution is
piece-wise linear
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P IH − P IL =
s˜2 − s˜1 − (z − 1)s˜1s˜2 − (s˜2 − zs˜1) (P IH − P IL)
(s˜2 − zs˜1) ,
so that the equilibrium level of price discrimination equals
P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L =
s˜2 − s˜1 − (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
2 (s˜2 − zs˜1) (6)
and thus that the equilibrium fraction of online searchers equals
F (P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L ) =
(z − 1)s˜1s˜2 + s˜2 − s˜1
2 (s˜2 − s˜1) .
Finally, applying the piece-wise linear search cost distribution to (3) and (4), it
is easy to see that the relation between the equilibrium online prices is given by
PE
∗
=
1
2
P I
∗
L
so that
P I
∗
L =
s˜2 − s˜1 + (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
3z (s˜2 − s˜1) θ,
which implies that
PE
∗
=
s˜2 − s˜1 + (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
6z (s˜2 − s˜1) θ
and
P I
∗
H =
s˜2 − s˜1 + (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
3z (s˜2 − s˜1) θ +
s˜2 − s˜1 − (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
2 (s˜2 − zs˜1) .
Using the previous proposition and the fact that for a piece-wise linear distribution
f ′ = 0 in the interior of the intervals, online equilibrium prices always change in the
same direction and the level of online price dispersion P I
∗
L −PE
∗
positively correlates
with both prices.
The above expressions hold true as long as ŝ1 < s˜1 < ŝ2 < s˜2. Using the
expressions for the different prices, and therefore for ŝ1 and ŝ2, this implies that
the parameters should satisfy
s˜2 − s˜1 − s˜1s˜2
s˜1(5s˜2 − 6s˜1) < z <
s˜22 − (s˜2 − s˜1)(1− s˜2)
s˜1s˜2
.50 (7)
In the two propositions below, we formulate the comparative statics properties
of our model using the piece-wise linear search cost distribution. The first proposi-
tion that follows states the results in terms of absolute price levels, while the next
proposition states the results in terms of price differences (price discrimination and
dispersion).
50Note that these conditions are independent of θ. As an example, if z = 1 these inequalities
reduce to 1
6
< s˜1 <
1
2
and s˜2 >
1
2
. Or, when s˜1 =
1
5
and s˜2 =
3
5
, 7
9
< z < 5
3
has to hold.
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Proposition 2 (price levels) If (7) holds, then an increase in the fraction of online
searchers F (P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L ), initiated by an increase in z, coincides with a decrease in
online prices PE
∗
and P I
∗
L if and only if s˜2 − s˜1 > s˜2s˜1, while it coincides with an
increase in the baseline price P I
∗
H if θ is small enough, z is large enough, and/or
s˜2 − s˜1 is small enough.
The conditions mentioned in the proposition should be interpreted as follows.
First, if s˜2 − s˜1 < s˜2s˜1, then s˜1 is relatively close to s˜2. In this case, if z increases
there are relatively many consumers that will search online that are relatively loyal
to the incumbent (have higher switching cost) and they will continue to buy from the
incumbent (but at its online price). This gives the incumbent more market power
online, resulting in higher prices. The reverse is true if s˜2 − s˜1 > s˜2s˜1. Second,
the result for the incumbent’s baseline price can be understood as follows. If θ
is relatively small, then there is fierce competition online and the more consumers
search online, the more the incumbent wants to extract surplus from the consumers
with high search and switching cost. On the other hand, for the piece-wise linear
search cost distribution we specified, if z is relatively large, or s˜2 − s˜1 is relatively
small, then there are few consumers that are indifferent between staying with the
incumbent or searching online, which again gives the incumbent an incentive to
increase its baseline price.
In line with our presentation of the empirical results, we present the results on
price differences separately.
Proposition 3 (Price discrimination and dispersion) If (7) holds, then an increase
in the fraction of online searchers F (P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L ), initiated by an increase in z,
coincides with (i) an increase in price discrimination P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L and (ii) a decrease
in online price dispersion P I
∗
L −PE
∗
, if and only if s˜2−s˜1 > s˜1s˜2 and (iii) an increase
in overall price dispersion P I
∗
H −PE
∗
if θ is small enough, z is large enough, or s˜2−s˜1
is small enough.
These results can be understood along similar lines as above. Proposition 1 al-
ready stated under general conditions that online price dispersion is correlated to the
incumbent’s online price. That proposition also indicated that price discrimination
may increase if the inverse hazard condition is satisfied, which is the case for the
piece-wise linear distribution. Finally, overall price dispersion is closely related to
the incumbent’s baseline price and in Proposition 2 we have explained the conditions
under which that price is increasing.
Figure 5 depicts how the different prices change as a function of z when s˜2 = 3/5
and s˜1 = 1/5 and θ = 2/5. As
∂F (P I
∗
H −P I
∗
L )
∂z is a constant positive number, this figure
can also be interpreted as how prices are linked to the fraction of searchers. One
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Figure 5: Model prediction
Note: The figure predicts price changes as a function of z with s˜2 = 3/5 and
s˜1 = 1/5 and θ = 2/5. P
I
H , P
I
L, and P
E denote the incumbents’ baseline tariffs, the
incumbents’ cheapest (online) tariffs, and the overall cheapest entrants’ tariffs,
respectively.
can see that for these parameter values, the incumbent’s baseline price is increasing
in the fraction of searchers, whereas the other two prices are decreasing, resulting in
more price discrimination and (overall) price dispersion, while online price dispersion
is decreasing.
Thus, if markets (regions) mainly differ in the fraction of low search cost con-
sumers (measured here by a difference in z), then an increase in online search is ac-
companied by more severe price discrimination by the incumbent, and if the search
costs in the population are sufficiently spread (s˜2 − s˜1 is large enough compared to
s˜1s˜2) by less online price dispersion and more overall price dispersion. Thus, our
model can match the patterns found empirically in the previous sections. Of course,
other pricing patterns are also possible for different parameter values.
Welfare Analysis of Price Discrimination
We will now analyze whether consumers are better off without price discrimination.
To this end, we simply force P IH = P
I
L (and denote this value by P
I) and solve for
the equilibrium values, denoting the price choice of the entrant under “no discrimi-
nation” by PEND (to distinguish it from the price it chooses when the incumbent can
price discriminate). As now we have that
piE = F (ŝ1; z)P
E = F
(
P I − PEND
θ
; z
)
PEND
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Figure 6: Average prices with and without price discrimination
Note: The figure predicts price changes as a function of z with s˜2 = 3/5 and
s˜1 = 1/5 and θ = 2/5. P¯ represents the average tariff with price discrimination;
P¯ND represents the average tariff without price discrimination.
and
piI = [1− F (ŝ1; z)]P I =
[
1− F
(
P I − PEND
θ
; z
)]
P I ,
it is easy to see that the two F.O.C.s are given by
F
(
P I − PEND
θ
; z
)
− f
(
P I − PEND
θ
; z
)
PEND
θ
= 0,
and
1− F
(
P I − PEND
θ
; z
)
− f
(
P I − PEND
θ
; z
)
P I
θ
= 0.
Note that these conditions are very close to (3) and (4). In particular, it is
clear that as F (P IH − P IL; z) < 1 in (4) in equilibrium P IL < P I and that because of
the strategic complementarity of the price strategies, PE < PEND. Thus, searching
consumers are better off with price discrimination. Intuitively, without price dis-
crimination the incumbent has a larger share of “loyal” consumers he serves with the
price P I , compared to when it can price discriminate where P IL is meant to compete
with the entrant’s price and the large share of loyal consumers is “addressed” by P IH .
Thus, with price discrimination, there is simply more online competition to gain or
attract searching consumers.
To compare P IH and P
I for the general case (and thus to make an overall com-
parison of the average price consumers pay51) is more difficult. Intuitively, though,
51One can also inquire into how the average price depends on the search intensity. The weighted
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it would be natural to have that P IH > P
I as under price discrimination the incum-
bent does not need to directly compete with the entrant’s price when setting P IH .
This is easily confirmed for the uniform distribution of search costs, where z = 1. In
that case PE
∗
= θ6 , P
I∗
L =
θ
3 , and P
I∗
H =
1
2 +
θ
3 , while P
E∗
ND=
θ
3 , P
I∗ = 2θ3 . As θ < 1
it is easy to see that P I
∗
< P I
∗
H .
For the case of the uniform distribution, it is also easy to calculate the average
price consumers pay as 12
(
1
2 +
θ
3
)
+ 13
θ
3+
1
6
θ
6 =
1
4+
11θ
36 , for the case of price discrimina-
tion, while without price discrimination, the average price equals 23
2θ
3 +
1
3
θ
3 =
5θ
9 . It
follows that as θ < 1, on average, the effect of the higher baseline price P I
∗
H dominates
and that consumers are worse off under price discrimination. Figure 6 confirms that,
for the piece-wise linear distribution that we have considered above and for the same
parameter values (s˜2 = 3/5 and s˜1 = 1/5 and θ = 2/5), on average consumers are
worse off under price discrimination. This average hides, however, that searching
consumers are better off, and that loyal consumers are considerably worse off under
price discrimination. In addition, with price discrimination, there will be fewer con-
sumers switching to entrants than if price discrimination were banned. Note that the
fraction of switchers is given by F
(
P IL−PE
θ ; z
)
for the case of price discrimination
and by F
(
P I−PEND
θ ; z
)
when price discrimination is banned. We have argued that
P IL < P
I and PE < PEND. As for the piece-wise linear distribution P
E
ND = P
I/2
and PE = P IL/2 it follows that
P IL−PE
θ <
P I−PEND
θ so that fewer consumers switch
under price discrimination.
7 Conclusion
After some 20 years of market liberalization and the entry of many companies,
incumbents in Germany’s local electricity retail markets still serve many consumers
at higher prices than their competitors and prices remain highly dispersed. We
provide an empirical analysis and a theoretical model detailing and explaining the
pricing patterns. Using data on three tariffs (the incumbent’s baseline price, the
incumbent’s cheapest price and the overall cheapest price) for each German zip code
in the years 2011–2014, we empirically find that, on average, the incumbent’s baseline
tariff is increased in areas where consumers search more, whereas the incumbent’s
online tariff is aggressively reduced in areas with intensified consumer search. The
overall cheapest tariff set by an entrant also decreases if there is more search, however
the effect is much smaller. This pattern of price effects gives rise to increased overall
price dispersion and price discrimination as well as reduced online price dispersion
in local markets where consumers search more.
average price is given by (1− (F (ŝ2))P I∗H + (F (ŝ2)− F (ŝ1))P I
∗
L + F (ŝ1)P
E∗ = P I
∗
H − F (ŝ2)(P I
∗
H −
P I
∗
L )− F (ŝ1)(P I
∗
L − PE
∗
).
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Using a search theoretic model incorporating incumbency advantages, we show
that the incumbent baseline price may increase when consumers search more. Unless
they make an active move to search and switch at a cost, consumers stay with the
incumbent contract. The incentive to increase the baseline tariff arises if a lower
price would not keep many consumers from searching and catering to high search cost
consumers allows the incumbent to siphon off larger loyalty rents. In contrast, once
consumers have shown a willingness to search, the incumbent has a strong incentive
to prevent consumers from switching to an entrant by setting a low online price.
That is, incumbents engage in price discrimination with a high baseline price and
a low online price. The incumbent’s cheapest online tariff is still higher, however,
than the overall cheapest tariff in the market, as consumers – presumably – attach
a brand or loyalty premium to the incumbent. By engaging in price discrimination,
the incumbent segments the markets into a segment of consumers with higher search
costs and one with lower search costs.
The success of market liberalization hinges on the possible strategies the in-
cumbent is able to choose. Price discrimination allows the incumbent to segment
markets according to search behavior, and to simultaneously appropriate surplus
from consumers with high search and switching cost and help to prevent consumers
who indicated they are willing to engage in search to switch to an entrant. In this
way, few consumers may actually switch suppliers, allowing the incumbent to appro-
priate an important share of market revenue. This strategy may explain why even
after some 20 years of market liberalization, incumbent’s prices are still relatively
high, and why a large fraction of consumers still buy from the incumbent.
In terms of welfare, we find that price discrimination is always beneficial for
searching consumers, but that – for piece-wise linear search cost distributions –
loyal consumers are worse off, and that on average the latter effect dominates, so
that on average consumers are worse off. More generally, policies to foster search,
while reducing prices in the competitive segments of the market, may also have
a negative externality on non-searching consumers who must pay higher baseline
prices if more consumers search.
We believe that this paper goes a long way towards describing and explaining
the pricing behavior of incumbents and entrants after the liberalization of markets.
However, once they have gained some market share, entrants may also try to increase
their own prices, exploiting their own (small) incumbency effect. Moreover, the
entrant may also engage in a price discrimination strategy where it sells at different
prices to new customers online and to customers it attracted in previous years. These
effects, although potentially small, are worthy of study. This requires, however, a
dynamic model that is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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Appendix
A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Screenshot of a typical online comparison platform
Note: Comparison platforms (here www.toptarif.de) list all available tariffs for a
consumer given its expected annual consumption level for its local zip code,
starting with the cheapest available tariff (including annual savings compared to
the default incumbent baseline tariff). Site accessed on September 18, 2018.
40
Figure A2: Incumbents’ baseline tariffs (2012)
Note: The figure presents the spatial distribution of the incumbents’ baseline
tariffs for the year 2012.
41
Figure A3: Change of incumbents’ baseline tariffs from 2011 to 2012
Note: The figure presents the spatial distribution of changes in the incumbents’
baseline tariffs from 2011 to 2012.
42
Figure A4: (Net) costs (2012)
Note: The figure presents the spatial distribution of the (net) costs for electricity
retailers in 2012.
43
Figure A5: Consumer search intensity (2012)
Note: The figure presents the spatial distribution of consumer search intensity in
2012.
44
Figure A6: Distribution of consumer search intensity before and after
trimming the highest 2% of the observations
Note: We trim the highest 2% of the observations on consumer search, as they may
be the result of data crawling “shop bots” or data research, not from actual
consumers searching for electricity tariffs.
45
Figure A7: Quadratic impact of consumer search on prices and
dispersion
Note: The figure presents the quadratic relation of prices and dispersion measures
within the 5% and 95% intervals of the logged consumer search.
46
Figure A8: Price zones of Envia Mitteldeutsche energie GmbH
47
Table A1: Decomposition of standard deviations between and within
zip codes
Variable Mean SD between SD within
Incumbents’ baseline tariff (P IH) 1,006 37.5 68.9
Incumbents’ cheaper online tariffs (P IL) 929 37.4 78.7
Entrants’ overall cheapest tariffs (PE) 808 20.8 55.6
Competitors (#) 133 15.2 19.8
Net costs 683 29.0 31.2
Consumer search intensity (µ) 9.23 3.30 5.4
Head of HH below age of 40 (U40) 24.7 5.1 0.8
Broadband internet availability (BBA) 63.8 29.7 13.1
Table A2: First-stage regressions of consumer search (µ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(µ) ln(µ) µ µ
U40 0.0164*** 0.0195*** 0.1016*** 0.1015***
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0280) (0.0295)
BBA 0.0005*** 0.0005** 0.0065*** 0.0048**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0017)
ln(Costs) 0.4702***
(0.1278)
Costs 0.0296***
(0.0020)
#Competitors 0.0056*** 0.0843***
(0.0006) (0.0054)
Average HH size 0.7712*** 3.981***
(0.0999) (0.1.041)
Income <25k e/a -0.0302 3.911***
(0.0993) (1.0308)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861 25,861
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. ∗∗∗p <
1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A3: OLS estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Costs 0.256*** 0.422*** 0.515***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.007)
#Competitors 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.046*** -0.015 -0.015***
(0.005) (0.014) (0.004)
Income <25k e/a 0.008 -0.067*** -0.006
(0.007) (0.014) (0.005)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 1%,
∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
Table A4: OLS estimates of the impact of consumer search on
dispersion (log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.013*** 0.052*** -0.046**
(0.002) (0.016) (0.020)
Costs -0.842*** -1.304*** -0.732***
(0.047) (0.218) (0.251)
#Competitors 0.003*** -0.034*** 0.058***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Average HH size 0.277*** 0.891*** 1.044***
(0.032) (0.189) (0.213)
Income <25k e/a 0.092* 0.721*** -0.886***
(0.054) (0.191) (0.233)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
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Table A5: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log) – estimations without covariates
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.040*** -0.060** -0.017**
(0.010) (0.024) (0.007)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 18.84 18.84 18.84
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.01 0.02
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
Table A6: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log) – Estimations without covariates
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.209*** 0.706** -0.887**
(0.057) (0.318) (0.379)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 18.84 18.84 18.84
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.03 0.01
Observations 25861 25861 25861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A7: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(level-level)
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 4.427*** -13.022*** -2.851***
(1.530) (3.930) (0.897)
Costs 0.243*** 0.958*** 0.674***
(0.048) (0.121) (0.029)
#Competitors 0.237* 4.617*** 0.278***
(0.140) (0.349) (0.080)
Average HH size 19.159** 15.217 -1.149
(7.938) (20.061) (4.922)
Income <25k e/a 22.991** -108.285*** -15.904**
(10.065) (24.056) (6.200)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 7.91 7.91 7.91
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A8: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(level-level)
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 7.387*** 17.725*** -9.500***
(2.086) (4.750) (3.388)
Costs -0.434*** -0.726*** 0.267**
(0.065) (0.146) (0.105)
#Competitors -0.054 -4.413*** 4.270***
(0.188) (0.419) (0.304)
Average HH size 20.812* 3.390 15.755
(11.085) (23.884) (17.494)
Income <25k e/a 39.428*** 132.376*** -89.455***
(13.980) (29.352) (20.785)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 7.91 7.91 7.91
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A9: IV estimates of a non-linear impact of consumer search on
prices (log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.046*** -0.320*** -0.077***
(0.010) (0.031) (0.008)
Search2 -0.003*** 0.075*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Costs 0.251*** 0.128*** 0.454***
(0.010) (0.028) (0.009)
#Competitors 0.000*** 0.003*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.023*** 0.058** 0.005
(0.008) (0.025) (0.007)
Income <25k e/a 0.006 0.009 0.010*
(0.008) (0.022) (0.006)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat. 17.11 17.11 17.11
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA and for µ2 by the square of the first-stage prediction
of µ. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A10: IV estimates of a non-linear impact of consumer search on
dispersion (log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.507*** 3.524*** -3.794***
(0.065) (0.407) (0.417)
Search2 (µ2) -0.084*** -0.775*** 0.876***
(0.006) (0.037) (0.037)
Costs -0.573*** 1.684*** -4.142***
(0.066) (0.372) (0.369)
#Competitors 0.004*** -0.025*** 0.047***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Average HH size 0.101* 0.018 1.930***
(0.054) (0.312) (0.340)
Income <25k e/a 0.003 -0.071 -0.018
(0.065) (0.277) (0.294)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat. 17.11 17.11 17.11
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA and for µ2 by the square of the first-stage prediction of µ.
∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A11: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on markups
(log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Markup Markup Markup
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
mIH m
I
L m
E
Search (µ) 0.373*** -2.905*** -2.397***
(0.071) (0.766) (0.591)
Costs -3.300*** -8.468*** -30.573***
(0.082) (0.763) (0.704)
#Competitors 0.003*** 0.171*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
Average HH size 0.079 3.746*** 3.247***
(0.067) (0.682) (0.574)
Income <25k e/a 0.125 -3.315*** -0.557
(0.080) (0.612) (0.463)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 23.67 23.67 23.67
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A12: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on markup
dispersion (log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Markup Markup Markup
Dispersion Discrimination Online Dispersion
mIH −mE mIH −mIL mIL −mE
Search (µ) 0.274*** 1.706*** -1.239***
(0.057) (0.392) (0.298)
Costs -1.041*** -2.190*** -0.359
(0.069) (0.395) (0.333)
#Competitors 0.002*** -0.038*** 0.056***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Average HH size 0.113** 0.110 1.204***
(0.055) (0.338) (0.283)
Income <25k e/a 0.089 0.670** -0.825***
(0.065) (0.279) (0.230)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 23.67 23.67 23.67
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is
by GMM. Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A13: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on Lerner
Indices (log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Lerner Index Lerner Index Lerner Index
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
LIH L
I
L L
E
Search (µ) 0.029*** -0.092*** -0.027***
(0.006) (0.020) (0.006)
Costs -0.522*** -0.389*** -0.390***
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008)
#Competitors 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.015*** 0.043** 0.001
(0.006) (0.018) (0.006)
Income <25k e/a 0.008 -0.052*** -0.005
(0.006) (0.014) (0.005)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 23.67 23.67 23.67
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A14: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on Lerner
Index dispersion (log-log)
(1) (2) (3)
Lerner Index Lerner Index Lerner Index
Dispersion Discrimination Online Dispersion
LIH − LE LIH − LIL LIL − LE
Search (µ) 0.056*** 0.121*** -0.064***
(0.010) (0.023) (0.017)
Costs -0.131*** -0.133*** 0.003
(0.012) (0.023) (0.019)
#Competitors 0.000* -0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.014 -0.028 0.042***
(0.010) (0.020) (0.015)
Income <25k e/a 0.013 0.059*** -0.047***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.013)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 23.67 23.67 23.67
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is
by GMM. Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A15: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log) – Hausman type instruments for search
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.045*** -0.157*** -0.030***
(0.009) (0.026) (0.006)
Costs 0.234*** 0.491*** 0.527***
(0.011) (0.031) (0.009)
#Competitors 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.022** 0.084*** 0.006
(0.009) (0.026) (0.006)
Income <25k e/a 0.012 -0.061*** -0.005
(0.009) (0.022) (0.005)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 32.90 32.90 32.90
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,661 25,661 25,661
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA in the 50 surrounding zip codes. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A16: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log) – Hausman type instruments for search
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.220*** 1.810*** -2.277***
(0.053) (0.352) (0.385)
Costs -0.935*** -2.126*** 0.403
(0.062) (0.392) (0.431)
#Competitors 0.002*** -0.045*** 0.072***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Average HH size 0.131*** -0.200 2.397***
(0.049) (0.340) (0.369)
Income <25k e/a 0.082 0.635** -0.859***
(0.060) (0.291) (0.313)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 32.90 32.90 32.90
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,661 25,661 25,661
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA in the 50 surrounding zip codes. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
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Table A17: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log) – additionally instrumented for #Competitors
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.031*** -0.125*** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.027) (0.006)
#Competitors 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Costs 0.254*** 0.501*** 0.524***
(0.011) (0.028) (0.009)
Average HH size 0.023*** 0.051** 0.006
(0.008) (0.024) (0.006)
Income <25k e/a 0.014* -0.061*** -0.007
(0.008) (0.019) (0.006)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat. 15.30 15.30 15.30
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,661 25,661 25,661
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. Instrumented for #Competitors by #Competitors in
the 50 surrounding zip codes. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
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Table A18: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log) – additionally instrumented for #Competitors
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.220*** 1.453*** -1.539***
(0.053) (0.356) (0.382)
#Competitors 0.005*** -0.052*** 0.082***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Costs -0.856*** -2.199*** 0.391
(0.066) (0.347) (0.395)
Average HH size 0.100* 0.137 1.764***
(0.052) (0.304) (0.345)
Income <25k e/a 0.122** 0.698*** -0.824***
(0.062) (0.253) (0.293)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F -stat. 15.30 15.30 15.30
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,661 25,661 25,661
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. Instrumented for #Competitors by #Competitors in the 50
surrounding zip codes. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A19: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log) – alternative clustering of standard errors I
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.039* -0.115** -0.032**
(0.022) (0.058) (0.016)
Costs: C 0.238*** 0.476*** 0.530***
(0.045) (0.107) (0.038)
#Competitors 0.000** 0.005*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Income <25k e/a 0.009 -0.070*** -0.007
(0.016) (0.023) (0.010)
Average HH size 0.023 0.053 0.004
(0.019) (0.055) (0.015)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 10.19 10.19 10.19
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the incumbents’ price zone level in parentheses.
Estimation is by GMM. Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
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Table A20: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log) – alternative clustering of standard errors I
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.292** 1.398* -1.361*
(0.136) (0.787) (0.754)
Costs: C -0.979*** -1.963* -0.088
(0.287) (1.147) (1.351)
#Competitors 0.002 -0.042*** 0.066***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
Income <25k e/a 0.100 0.762** -0.926***
(0.131) (0.308) (0.310)
Average HH size 0.104 0.058 1.858**
(0.131) (0.749) (0.924)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 10.19 10.19 10.19
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the incumbents’ price zone level in parentheses. Estimation
is by GMM. Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A21: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log) – alternative clustering of standard errors II
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.039* -0.115* -0.032**
(0.023) (0.063) (0.015)
Costs 0.238*** 0.476*** 0.530***
(0.063) (0.175) (0.041)
#Competitors 0.000** 0.005*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Income <25k e/a 0.009 -0.070** -0.007
(0.016) (0.032) (0.010)
Average HH size 0.023 0.053 0.004
(0.017) (0.068) (0.016)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 9.95 9.95 9.95
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the incumbency area level in parentheses. Estima-
tion is by GMM. Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
65
Table A22: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log) – alternative clustering of standard errors II
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.292** 1.398* -1.361
(0.131) (0.829) (0.926)
Costs -0.979*** -1.963 -0.088
(0.337) (1.593) (2.187)
#Competitors 0.002 -0.042*** 0.066***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.017)
Income <25k e/a 0.100 0.762** -0.926**
(0.133) (0.386) (0.387)
Average HH size 0.104 0.058 1.858
(0.108) (0.870) (1.529)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 9.95 9.95 9.95
Observations 25,861 25,861 25,861
Note: Standard errors clustered at the incumbency area level in parentheses. Estimation is
by GMM. Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A23: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log) – alternative instrument for BBA also including mobile
internet availability of at least 16 Mbit/s
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.040*** -0.078*** -0.024***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.006)
Costs 0.252*** 0.496*** 0.548***
(0.011) (0.022) (0.008)
#Competitors 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.023*** 0.031 -0.000
(0.008) (0.020) (0.006)
Income <25k e/a 0.009 -0.068*** -0.006
(0.009) (0.016) (0.005)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 22.45 22.45 22.45
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,578 25,578 25,578
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and mobile internet availability for smart phones in addition to
fixed network internet of at least 16 Mbit/s. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A24: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log) – alternative instrument for BBA also including mobile
internet availability of at least 16 Mbit/s
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.232*** 0.930*** -0.960***
(0.055) (0.312) (0.326)
Costs -0.955*** -1.803*** 0.287
(0.064) (0.284) (0.319)
#Competitors 0.002*** -0.040*** 0.066***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Average HH size 0.129** 0.284 1.603***
(0.053) (0.265) (0.303)
Income <25k e/a 0.088 0.746*** -0.985***
(0.063) (0.212) (0.249)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 22.45 22.45 22.45
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,578 25,578 25,578
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and mobile internet availability for smart phones in addition to fixed
network internet of at least 16 Mbit/s. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A25: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on prices
(log-log)– instrument for BBA at 6 Mbit/s internet speed instead of 16
Mbit/s
(1) (2) (3)
Incumbent Base Incumbent Cheapest Overall Cheapest
P IH P
I
L P
E
Search (µ) 0.031*** -0.139*** -0.042***
(0.009) (0.029) (0.008)
Costs 0.243*** 0.486*** 0.535***
(0.010) (0.029) (0.010)
#Competitors 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average HH size 0.028*** 0.067*** 0.010
(0.008) (0.026) (0.008)
Income <25k e/a 0.008 -0.069*** -0.008
(0.008) (0.020) (0.006)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 21.41 21.41 21.41
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,578 25,578 25,578
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 andBBA but at 6 Mbit/s instead of 16 Mbit/s. ∗∗∗p < 1%,
∗∗p < 5%, ∗p < 10%.
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Table A26: IV estimates of the impact of consumer search on dispersion
(log-log) – instrument for BBA with 6 Mbit/s internet speed instead of
16 Mbit/s
(1) (2) (3)
Price Dispersion Price Discrimination Online Price Dispersion
P IH − PE P IH − P IL P IL − PE
Search (µ) 0.304*** 1.682*** -1.480***
(0.063) (0.379) (0.371)
Costs -0.980*** -2.077*** -0.080
(0.071) (0.352) (0.362)
#Competitors 0.002*** -0.044*** 0.066***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Average HH size 0.089 -0.078 1.812***
(0.059) (0.318) (0.332)
Income <25k e/a 0.087 0.746*** -0.964***
(0.067) (0.253) (0.273)
Zip code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F -stat. 21.41 21.41 21.41
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 25,578 25,578 25,578
Note: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses. Estimation is by GMM.
Instrumented for µ by U40 and BBA but at 6 Mbit/s instead of 16 Mbit/s. ∗∗∗p < 1%, ∗∗p < 5%,
∗p < 10%.
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B Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1. The effect of an increase in brand loyalty θ is that all prices
and online price dispersion increase, while overall price dispersion decreases and
price discrimination is unaffected. Price discrimination increases if, and only if, the
inverse hazard rate evaluated at the equilibrium values
1−F (P I∗H −P I
∗
L ;z)
f(P I
∗
H −P I
∗
L ;z)
is increasing
in z. Moreover, online price dispersion is positively related to P IL if the density
functions are non-increasing, i.e., ∂f
(
P IL−PE
θ ; z
)
/∂(P IL − PE) ≤ 0. Finally, online
price dispersion and price discrimination are linked by 1+f(P IH−P IL; z)(P IH−P IL) =
f
(
P IL−PE
θ ; z
)(
P IL+P
E
θ
)
.
Proof. The effects of changes in the loyalty parameter θ can be understood as
follows. First, it clearly follows from (5) that P IH−P IL, which is the measure of price
discrimination, is independent of θ. Recognizing this, it follows from deducting (3)
from (4) that
P IL−PE
θ is also independent of θ, or in other words, that P
I
L − PE ,
which is the measure of online price dispersion, is proportional to θ. From each of
the individual equations (3) and (4) it then follows that both P IL and P
E have to
be proportional to θ. Thus, all prices are increasing in θ. Overall price dispersion is
decreasing in θ as P IH increases less than proportionally.
To understand the effects of changes in z, we first consider the result on price
discrimination. Taking the total differential of (5) with respect to P IH − P IL and z
yields [
−2f(P IH − P IL; z)−
∂f(P IH − P IL; z)
∂(P IH − P IL)
(P IH − P IL)
]
d(P IH − P IL) (8)
=
[
∂f(P IH − P IL; z)
∂z
(P IH − P IL) +
F (P IH − P IL; z)
∂z
]
dz.
As profit maximization implies that the second-order condition of (5) with respect
to P IH − P IL is negative, it should be that in an equilibrium,
−2f(P IH − P IL; z)−
∂f(P IH − P IL; z)
∂(P IH − P IL)
(P IH − P IL) < 0.
On the other hand, the inverse hazard rate
1−F (P I∗H −P I∗L ;z)
f(P I∗H −P I∗L ;z)
is increasing in z if and
only if
−∂f(P
I
H − P IL; z)
∂z
(1− F (P IH − P IL; z))−
F (P IH − P IL; z)
∂z
f(P IH − P IL) > 0,
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which using (5) can be rewritten as
−f(P IH − P IL; z)
[
∂f(P IH − P IL; z)
∂z
(P IH − P IL) +
F (P IH − P IL; z)
∂z
]
> 0.
Thus, if the inverse hazard rate is increasing in z, then in any equilibrium both
square bracket terms in (8) are negative, implying
d(P IH−P IL)
dz > 0.
To investigate online price dispersion, we take the total differential of (3) with
respect to P IL and P
E to obtain
0 =
1
θ
[
f
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
− f ′
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
PE
θ
]
dP IL
+
1
θ
[
−2f
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
+ f
′
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
PE
θ
]
dPE ,
where f
′
is the derivative of the density function with respect to prices. From the
second-order condition for profit maximization by the entrant, we know that the
second term in square brackets must be negative. If f
′
(
P IL−PE
θ ; z
)
≤ 0, then the
first term in square brackets is positive, and its absolute value is smaller than the first
term in square brackets. Thus, 0 < dPE/dP IL < 1. Therefore, 0 < d(P
I
L−PE)/dP IL <
1.
Finally, to understand how price discrimination and online price dispersion are
related, we substitute (3) and (5) into (4) to get the condition stated in the Propo-
sition. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 (price levels). If (7) holds, then an increase in the fraction of
online searchers F (P I
∗
H −P I
∗
L ), initiated by an increase in z, coincides with a decrease
in online prices PE
∗
and P I
∗
L if and only if s˜2 − s˜1 > s˜2s˜1, while it coincides with an
increase in the baseline price P I
∗
H if θ is small enough, z is large enough, or s˜2 − s˜1
is small enough.
Proof. It is clear that
∂(P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L )
∂z
=
(s˜2 − s˜1)s˜1(1− s˜2)
2 (s˜2 − zs˜1)2
> 0.
From the expressions determining equilibrium prices, it follows that
2
∂PE
∗
∂z
=
∂P I
∗
L
∂z
= − θ
3z2
(
s˜2 − s˜1 − s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
)
,
which is clearly negative if and only if s˜2 − s˜1 > s˜2s˜1. Also,
∂P I
∗
H
∂z
=
θ
3z2
(
−1 + s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
)
+
(s˜2 − s˜1)s˜1(1− s˜2)
2 (s˜2 − zs˜1)2
.
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As the second term is positive, this is clearly positive if either the first term is small
enough (θ is small enough or z is large enough), or the first term is positive (s˜2− s˜1
is small enough). Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 (price discrimination and dispersion). If (7) holds, then an
increase in the fraction of online searchers F (P I
∗
H −P I
∗
L ), initiated by an increase in
z, coincides with (i) an increase in price discrimination P I
∗
H −P I
∗
L and (ii) a decrease
in online price dispersion P I
∗
L −PE
∗
, if and only if s˜2− s˜1 > s˜1s˜2 and (iii) an increase
in overall price dispersion P I
∗
H −PE
∗
if θ is small enough, z is large enough, or s˜2− s˜1
is small enough.
Proof. The proof simply follows from calculating the different partial deriva-
tives. As
∂(P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L )
∂z
=
(s˜2 − s˜1)s˜1(1− s˜2)
2 (s˜2 − zs˜1)2
> 0
and
∂F (P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L )
∂z
=
s˜1s˜2
2 (s˜2 − s˜1) > 0,
an increase in the fraction of online searchers, initiated by an increase in z, certainly
leads to an increase in price discrimination P I
∗
H − P I
∗
L . As
∂(P I
∗
L − PE
∗
)
∂z
= − θ
6z2
(
s˜2 − s˜1 − s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
)
it leads to a decrease in online price dispersion if s˜2 − s˜1 − s˜1s˜2 > 0. Finally, as
∂(P I
∗
H − PE
∗
)
∂z
=
θ
6z2
(
−1 + s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
)
+
(s˜2 − s˜1)s˜1(1− s˜2)
2 (s˜2 − zs˜1)2
,
and the second term is positive, it leads to an increase in price discrimination if
either the first term is small enough (θ is small enough or z is large enough), or the
first term is positive (s˜2 − s˜1 is small enough). Q.E.D.
C Additional Comparative Statics
Even under a piece-wise linear specification of the search cost distribution, the the-
oretical model allows for a rich set of comparative statics results, depending on how
the shift of the search cost distribution is modeled. Interestingly, even if the search
cost distribution shifts the probability mass towards lower search costs, it is not nec-
essary that there will be more online search. In the main body of the paper, we have
seen that if z is increasing, then lower search costs coincide with more online search,
but a shift in the search cost distribution towards lower search costs, represented
by a change in s˜2, coincides with less online search. The reason is that a different
part of the search cost distribution is shifted. An increase in z represents more
consumers with the lowest search cost levels, whereas an increase in s˜2 (for z > 1)
73
– or a decrease in s˜2 (for z < 1) – implies that the probability mass is shifted from
very high search cost levels to intermediate search cost levels (where the fraction of
consumers with the lowest search costs is not affected). The next result states this
more formally.
Claim 1 (a) An increase in s˜2 leads to an increase in the fraction of online searchers
F (P I
∗
H −P IL), an increase in price discrimination P I
∗
H −P IL and an increase in online
prices, if and only if z < 1. (b) If z < 1 an increase in s˜1 leads to a decrease in
the fraction of online searchers F (P I
∗
H − P IL), an increase in price discrimination
P I
∗
H − P IL and a decrease in online prices. If z > 1, the impact on the fraction of
online searchers is ambiguous, whereas the other effects are reversed.
D Sequential price setting game
When the firms compete in a sequential price setting game, in which the incumbent
sets its baseline rate first, the respective profits of the entrant and incumbent do not
change and are as given in the main text:
piE = F (ŝ1; z)P
E = F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
PE
and
piI = [F (ŝ2; z)− F (ŝ1; z)]P IL + (1− F (ŝ2; z))P IH
=
[
F (P IH − P I
e
L ; z)− F
(
P IH − PE
θ
; z
)]
P IL + (1− F (P IH − P I
e
L ); z)P
I
H .
In taking the first-order conditions, one has to be careful in this “Stackelberg”
environment where, in the second stage, the incumbent sets the online price P IL si-
multaneously with the entrant choosing PE , and the incumbent chooses the baseline
price P IH in the first stage. In this case, when setting online prices, both players
have to take the number of consumers who search online, i.e., F (P IH−P I
e
L ), as given.
Thus, if (as explained in the main text) both online prices react to the incumbent
baseline price, the F.O.C.s (evaluated at the equilibrium where P I
e
L = P
I∗
L ) for the
online prices (for given P IH), do not change either, so that they are given by:
F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
− f
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
PE
θ
= 0
and
F (P IH − P IL; z)− F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
− f
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
P IH
θ
= 0,
respectively. This determines the online prices for given P IH : P
E(P IH) and P
I
L(P
I
H).
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However, in determining the baseline price under “Stackelberg”, the incumbent
and the consumers take these reactions into account. Thus, when observing P IH ,
consumers realize that the second stage prices will be affected by a change in P IH .
Thus, the incumbent sets P IH such that
0 = −f(P IH − P IL; z)(P IH − P IL)(1−
∂P IL
∂P IH
)− P
I
H
θ
f
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)
∂(P IL − PE)
∂P IH
+
[
F (P IH − P IL; z)− F
(
P IL − PE
θ
; z
)]
∂P IL
∂P IH
+ (1− F (P IH − P IL; z))
This expression has several new terms compared to the F.O.C. for P IH in the simul-
taneous choice model analyzed in the main text as, when setting P IH the incumbent
(and the consumers) now consider how both online prices and the market shares
change in response to changes in P IH .
For general distribution functions, it is not possible to solve these three equations
in a meaningful way. Thus, in the rest of this appendix we consider the piece-wise
linear distribution, where (as in the main text) we consider
P IL−PE
θ < s˜1 < P
I
H−P IL <
s˜2. As in the main text, the solution to (3) yields P
E = P IL/2, while in combination
with (4) we have(
3z
2θ
+
s˜2 − zs˜1
s˜2 − s˜1
)
P IL =
s˜2 − zs˜1
s˜2 − s˜1 P
I
H +
(z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1 .
Note from this equation it is clear that online prices are increasing in P IH but not
to the full extent. In particular, 0 <
∂(P IL−PE)
∂P IH
<
∂P IL
∂P IH
< 1. Thus, if
P IL−PE
θ < s˜1 <
P IH − P IL < s˜2 the incumbent base line price solves
0 = − s˜2 − zs˜1
s˜2 − s˜1 (P
I
H − P IL)
(
1−
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
)
− z
2θ
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
P IH
+
[
(z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1 −
s˜2 − zs˜1
s˜2 − s˜1 (P
I
H − P IL)− z
P IL − PE
θ
] s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
+ 1− (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1 −
s˜2 − zs˜1
s˜2 − s˜1 (P
I
H − P IL),
or as (
3z
2θ
+
s˜2 − zs˜1
s˜2 − s˜1
)
P IL =
s˜2 − zs˜1
s˜2 − s˜1 P
I
H +
(z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
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we have that
0 = −2
(
3z
2θ
P IL −
(z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
)
− z
θ
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
P IL
+ 1− (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
(
1−
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
)
,
which can be simplified to
z
θ
(
3 +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
)
P IL = 1 +
(z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − s˜1
(
1 +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
)
.
Thus, we have that the different equilibrium prices for the incumbent are given by
P IL =
1 + (z−1)s˜1s˜2s˜2−s˜1
(
1 +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ
+
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
)
z
θ
(
3 +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ
+
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
)
so that
P IH =
1 + (z−1)s˜1s˜2s˜2−s˜1
(
1 +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ
+
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
)
z
θ
(
3 +
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
3z
2θ
+
s˜2−zs˜1
s˜2−s˜1
) (1 + 3z
2θ
s˜2 − s˜1
s˜2 − zs˜1
)
− (z − 1)s˜1s˜2
s˜2 − zs˜1 .
For the parameter values we considered before, where θ = 2/5, s˜1 = 3/10 and
s˜2 = 3/5, this results in
P IL =
1 + .18(z−1).3
(
1 + 6−3z9z
0.8
+6−3z
)
5z
2
(
3 + 6−3z9z
0.8
+6−3z
)
and
P IH =
1 + .18(z−1).3
(
1 + 6−3z9z
0.8
+6−3z
)
5z
2
(
3 + 6−3z9z
0.8
+6−3z
) (1 + .9z
0.8(.6− .3z)
)
− .18(z − 1)
.6− .3z .
Figure D1 plots these prices under sequential price setting as a function of z to-
gether with the corresponding prices for the simultaneous move game analyzed in
the main text. The figure shows that the two different analyses (simultaneous versus
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Figure D1: Price patterns: simultaneous versus sequential game
Notes: The figure predicts price changes under sequential price setting (green) and
simultaneous price setting (black) as a function of z with s˜2 = 3/5 and s˜1 = 1/5
and θ = 2/5. Since the entrants’ online tariffs (PE) are half of the incumbents’
cheaper online tariffs (P IL), P
E is not shown for better clarity.
sequential choice of oﬄine and online prices) show that equilibrium outcomes are
very close to each other. The reason is twofold. First, as indicated above, for given
and identical P IH , the online market is governed by the same incentives and F.O.C.s.
Second, if in the sequential setting the incumbent wants to increase its baseline tariff
compared to the simultaneous choice setting, the incumbent not only gains because
all prices will increase, but also loses as more consumers will switch to the entrant
instead of buying from the online incumbent’s price. These opposing forces are such
that the net effect is that the baseline price is almost identical in the two cases.
The figure shows that if online prices react to the baseline price, the same pattern
with respect to changes in z emerges, namely that if z increases (and therefore, more
consumers search online), online prices decrease, while the incumbent’s baseline
price increases. Thus, price discrimination between loyal and searching consumers
increases and online price dispersion decreases.
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